S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. II.
De cognitione Dei per similitudines propinquas sive per imaginem.
ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 80-82.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Nunc vero ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

ARTICULUS I.

De prima assignatione imaginis

Consequenter ad intelligentiam istius partis secundae praesentis distinctionis, cuius divisio posita est supra,[2] quantum ad primam assignationem imaginis, quae est per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, tria quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum in his tribus attendatur ratio imaginis.
Secundum est de comparatione istarum ad obiectum.
Tertium est de comparatione earum ad animam vel subiectum.

QUAESTIO I.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART II
On the cognition of God through near similitudes or through the image.
ARTICLE I

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 80-82.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

But now let us come presently to that disputation etc.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

ARTICLE I

On the first impression of the image

Consequently for the understanding of the second part of his present distinction, the Division of which has been put above,[2] as much as regards the first impression [assignationem] of the image, which is through memory, intelligence and will, three (things) are required.

The first is, whether in these three (powers) a reckoning of an image is attained.
The second concerns the comparison of these to the object.
The third concerns their comparison to the soul and/or subject.

QUESTION 1

Utrum ratio imaginis attendatur in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.

Whether the reckoning of the image is attained in the memory, intelligence and will.

QUOD AUTEM in omnibus simul sit, videtur.

1. Ad rationem enim imaginis requiritur expressa conformatio in distinctione; sed distinctio in divinis attenditur quantum ad tres personas: ergo maxime[3] in imagine creata attenditur quantum ad tres potentias.

2. Item, ratio imaginis consistit in perfecta capacitate, quia secundum Augustinum[4] « eo est mens imago, quo potest esse capax et particeps Dei »; sed Deus non capitur ab anima plene nisi ametur, neque amatur nisi intelligatur, nec intelligitur nisi praesens ad animam habeatur; sed primum est per voluntatem, secundum per intelligentiam, tertium per memoriam: ergo etc.

3. Item, notitia sive intelligentia appropriatur Filio, voluntas Spiritui Sancto: ergo aut truncata et diminuta erit assignatio imaginis, aut necesse est ponere potentiam respondentem Patri.

SED CONTRA: 1. Ad esse imaginis requiritur repraesentatio in distinctione originis et ordinis; sed in istis potentiis non est talis distinctio, quia simul sunt cum anima concreatae, nec una est ab alia nec una[5] post aliam: ergo in istis non est reperire rationem imaginis.

2. Item, imago est repraesentatio secundum exteriorem dispositionem, ut patet;[6] sed istae tres potentiae sunt intimae ipsi animae: ergo in ipsis non est ratio imaginis.

3. Item, quod specialiter *memoria* non sit de ratione imaginis, videtur, quia imago cum sit animae essentialis et secundum potentiam rationalem sit in ipsa, memoria vero, ut dicit Philosophus,[7] est sensibilium, quia est in brutis; unde differt a reminiscentia, quia reminiscentia non est in

MOREOVER THAT it is in all together, seems (from this):

1. For there is required for the reckoning of the image an expressed conformation in a distinction; but distinction among the divine is attained as much as regards the Three Persons: therefore most of all [maxime][3] is it attained in the created image as much as regards the three powers (of the soul).

2. Likewise, the reckoning of the image consists in a perfect capacity, because according to (St.) Augustine[4] « the mind is an image by that, whereby it can be a grasper of and sharer in God [capax et particeps Dei] »; but God is not grasped by the soul fully unless He is loved, nor is He loved unless He is understood, nor is He understood unless He is held present to the soul; but the first is through the will, the second through the intelligence, the third through the memory: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, knowledge [notitia] or intelligence is appropriated to the Son, will to the Holy Spirit: therefore either the impression of the image will be truncated or diminished, or it is necessary to posit a power responding to the Father.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. To be an image there is required a representation in a distinction of origin and of order; but in these powers (of the soul) there is no such distinction, because all have been co-created [concreatae] together with the soul, nor is one from another nor one[5] after another: therefore among these there is no finding of a reckoning of image.

2. Likewise, an image is a representation according to an exterior disposition, as is clear;[6] but those three powers (of the soul) are most interior to the soul itself: therefore among them there is not a reckoning of an image.

3. Likewise, that the *memory* in particular does not concern the reckoning of the image, it seems, because the image, since it of an essential soul and according to (its) rational power is in (the same), but the memory, as the Philosopher says,[7] is of sensibles, because it is in brutes; whence it

brutis: ergo videtur quod memoria non pertineat ad imaginem. *Praeterea*, sive[8] memoria sit sensibilium sive in- / -telligibilium, . . .

differs from reminiscence, because reminiscence is not in brutes: therefore it seems that memory does not pertain to the image. *Moreover*, whether[8] the memory is of sensibles or of in- / -telligibles, . . .

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[2] Vat. omittit: *cuius divisio posita est supra*, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1; et paulo infra post *tribus* ponit *scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate*.
[3] Vat., obnitentibus mss., *necessario*. — De variis imaginis definitonbius, in quibus hoc argumentum et plura sequentia fundantur, cfr. d. 31. p. II. q. 1. et 2., ac ibid. dub. 2. et 3.
[4] Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. Vide supra d. III. in lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa initium. — Paulo infra post *praesens* ope mss. posuimus *ad* loco *apud*.
[5] Plures codd. ut A B I P Q T X etc. hic repetunt *est*.
[6] Codd. I X Y *ut in imagine hominis picti patet*. Immediate post cod. I *igitur si* loco *sed*.
[7] Libr. de Memoria et Reminisc. c. 1. et 2. (in aliis. edd. c. 2. et 4.). — Paulo infra post *brutis* Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit *unde differt* usque ad *in brutis*, ac mox habet *pertinet* loco *pertineat*. Paulo ante codd. N Z *connaturalis* pro *essentialis*.
[8] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *cum* loco *sive* et in fine argumenti *temporalibus* pro *temporibus*.

[2] The Vatican edition omits: *the Division of which has been put above*[cuius division posita est supra], which however is extant in the manuscripts and edition 1; and a little below this after *in these three* [in his tribus] it has *that is the memory, the intelligence and the will* [scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntate].
[3] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts, has *necessarily* [necessario]. — On the various definitions of an image, upon which this argument and the many following are founded, cf. d. 31, p. II, q. 1 and 2, and ibid., doubt 2 and 3.
[4] On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, ch. 8, n. 11. See the text of Master (Peter), d. 3, ch. 2 near the beginning. — A little below this after *present* [praesens] we have put *to* [ad] in place of *with* [apud], with the help of the manuscripts.
[5] Very many codices, as A B I P Q T X etc. here repeat *is*.
[6] Codices I X Y read *as is patent in the painted image of a man* [ut in imagine hominis picit patet]. Immediately after this codex I has *therefore if* [igitur si] in place of *but* [sed].
[7] (Aristotle's) book On Memory and Reminiscence, chs. 1 and 2 (in other editions chs. 2 and 4). — A little below this after *brutes* [brutis] the Vatican edition without the authority of any manuscript nor of edition 1 omits *whence it differs* up to *in brutes* [unde differt . . . in brutis], and then it has the indicative for *pertain* [pertinet]. A little before this codices N and Z have *connatural* [connaturalis] in place of *essential* [essentialis].
[8] The Vatican edition against the manuscripts and edition 1 has *since* [cum] in place of *whether* [sive] and at the end of the argument (on the next page) *and temporal conditions* [temporalibus] in place of *conditions and times* [temporibus].

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sive in- / -telligibilium, concernit differentiam temporis, quia est acceptatio praesens de praeteritis; sed imago abstrahit a conditionibus sensibilibus et temporibus: ergo etc.

or of in- / -telligibles, it concerns a difference of time, because there is a present acceptance of (things) past; but an image abstracts from sensible conditions and times.: ergo etc..

4. Item, imago attenditur in his quae sunt nata recipere imaginem reformationis sive similitudines; sed imago illa consistit in tribus virtutibus theologicis, quarum nulla est in memoria: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, the image is attained in those which are bound to receive an image of reformation or similitudes; but that image consists in the three theological virtues, none of which is in the memory: ergo etc..

5. Item, quod *voluntas* non sit de integritate

5. Likewise, it seems that the *will* does not

imaginis, videtur, quia dicitur in libro de Spiritu et anima:[1] « Imago est in potentia cognoscendi, similitudo est in potentia diligendi »; sed voluntas non pertinet ad potentiam cognitivam: ergo etc.

concern the integrity of the image, because there is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul:[1] « The image is in the power of cognizing, the similitude is in the power of loving [diligendi] »; but the will does not pertain to the cognitive power: ergo etc..

6. Item, omnis potentia, quae est de imagine, debet aliis aequari, quia ad rationem imaginis requiritur aequalitas; sed voluntas non aequatur aliis, quia multa intelligimus, quae non volumus: ergo etc. *Si dicas*, quod non attenditur aequalitas respectu obiectorum, sed respectu actuum, ut sit sensus: quaecumque[2] intelligo, volo me intelligere, adhuc non est verum, quia multorum meminimus, quae nollemus meminisse.

6. Likewise, every power, which concerns the image, ought to be equal to the others, because for the reckoning of an image there is required equality; but the will is not equal to the others, because we understand many (things), which we do not will: ergo etc.. *If you say*, that equality is not attained in respect to objects, but in respect to acts, as is sensing: whatever[2] I understand, I want myself to understand, yet it is not true, because we remember many (things), which we will to remember not.

CONCLUSIO.

Ratio imaginis attenditur in his tribus potentiis, memoria, intellectu et voluntate, cum comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum.

CONCLUSION

The reckoning of the image is attained in these three powers, memory, intellect and will, with a comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister recitat,[3] imago attenditur in his tribus potentiis, tamen in comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum, in quibus est distinctio et ordo et origo unius ab altero per modum quaendam disponendi. Nam retentio speciei disponit ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum, si quod intelligitur est bonum.[4]

I respond: It must be said, that, as (St.) Augustine says and Master (Peter) recites,[3] the image is attained in these three powers, however (this is) in comparison to the unity of essence and the plurality of acts, in which there is distinction and order and origin of one from another through the a certain manner of disposing. For the retention of species disposes to understanding and understanding to loving, if what is understood is good.[4]

1. Et per hoc patet solutio ad illud quod obiicitur: in istis potentiis non est distinctio per originem: ergo etc.

1. And through this the solution to that which is objected is clear: in those powers (of the soul) there is not a distinction through origin: ergo etc..

2. Ad illud[5] quod obiicitur, quod imago attenditur secundum exteriorem dispositionem; dicendum, quod est imago rei *corporalis* et sensibilis; et haec, quia offert se cognitioni per exteriora, habet imaginem repraesentantem secundum exteriorem dispositionem. Est iterum imago rei *spiritualis*, quae est intima cuilibet rei, et quae cognoscitur secundum quod virtus recolligitur ad intima; et haec[6] habet imaginem repraesentantem quantum ad

2. To that[5] which is objected, that an image is attained according to an exterior disposition; it must be said, that there is a *corporal* and a sensible image of a thing; and this, because it offers itself to cognition through exteriors, has an image representing according to an exterior disposition. And again there is a *spiritual* image of a thing, which is most interior [intima] to each thing, and which is cognized according to which (its) virtue is

intimas dispositiones.

recovered at a most interior level [recolligitur ad intima]; and this[6] has an image representing as much as regards most interior dispositions.

3. Ad illud[7] quod obiicitur, quod memoria est sensibilium; dicendum, quod memoria accipitur tripliciter: uno modo prout est receptiva et retentiva sensibilium et praeteritorum; alio modo prout est retentiva praeteritorum, sive sensibilium sive intelligibilium; et tertio modo prout est retentiva specierum, abstrahendo ab omni differentia temporis, utpote specierum innatarum. Et hoc tertio modo est pars imaginis; sed obiectio currit de aliis primis duobus modis. Primo modo memoria sequitur sensum, secundo modo sequitur ipsam intelligentiam et voluntatem, tertio modo antecedit et respondet Patri.

3. To that[7] which is objected, that memory is of sensibles; it must be said, that memory is accepted in a threefold manner: in one manner insofar as it is receptive and retentive of sensibles and things past; in another manner insofar as it is retentive of things past, whether sensibles or intelligibles; and in the third manner insofar as it is retentive of species, by abstracting from every difference of time, as of innate species. And in this third manner there is a part of the image; but the objection depends upon [currit de] the other first two manners. In the first manner the memory follows sensing, in the second manner it follows the intelligence itself and the will, in the third manner it precedes and (thus) corresponds to the Father.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod memoria non reformatur; dicendum, quod immo memoria reformatur et quantum ad statum viae et quantum ad statum patriae: in *primo* per *spem*; et hoc patet per expositionem Augustini super illud verbum Matthaei vigesimo secundo:[8] *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde*, « id est, intellectu sine errore, *ex tota anima*, id est, voluntate sine contradictione, *ex tota mente*, id est, memoria sine oblivione ». In *secundo* statu reformatur quantum ad *tentionem*; unde Bernardus[9] dicit, quod « Deus est futurus intelligentiae plenitudo lucis, voluntatis multitudo pacis, memoriae continuatio aeternitatis ». Nec est[10] inconveniens, quod memoria, quamvis sit prima, reformetur per dotem ultimam; quia ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a *posteriori*, ordo autem informationis[11] incipit a *superiori*: ideo a voluntate incipit reformatio et tendit usque in memoriam.

4. To that which is objected, that the memory is not reformed: it must be said, that nay rather the memory is reformed both as much as regards the state of way and the state of fatherland: in the *first* through *hope*; and this is clear through the exposition of (St.) Augustine on that verse in the twenty-second (chapter) of (St.) Matthew:[8] *You shall love the Lord thy God with (thy) whole heart*, « that is, with an intellect without error, *with (thy) whole soul*, that is, with a will without contradiction, *with (thy) whole mind*, that is, with a memory without forgetting ». In the *second* state it is reformed as much as regards (its) *grasp* [tentionem]; whence (St.) Bernard[9] says, that « God is going to be the fullness of light for the intelligence, the multitude of peace for the will, the continuation of eternity for the memory ». Nor is it[10] unfitting, that the memory, although it be first, be reformed through the last dowry; because the order of reformation and deformation begins from the *posterior* [a posteriori], but the order of information[11] begins from the *superior*: for that reason reformation begins from the will and tends even unto the memory.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est in potentia cognoscendi; dicendum, quod similitudo dicit quid gratuitum, et ideo dicitur esse per ap- / -propriationem in

5. To that which is objected, that the image is in the power of cognizing; it must be said, that the similitude (of the soul to God) means something gratuitous, and for that

voluntate sive in dilectione.

[1] Cap. 39: Anima rationalis et intellectus facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, ut factorem suum pro imagine cognoscat, et pro similitudine diligat. Ex imagine nameque Dei habet rationem et ex similitudine caritatem.
[2] Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut A C F G H I K T etc. et ed. 1 *quidquid*.
[3] Hic c. 2. — Paulo post Vat. *cum* loco *tamen in*, sed minus signanter et contra mss. et ed. 1.
[4] Corruptam lectionem Vat. *amandum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum* emendavimus ope mss. et ed. 1.
[5] Plures codd. ut A T etc. et ed. 1 *aliud* loco *illud*.
[6] Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *haec*. Paulo ante post *virtus* in cod. A additur *intelligibiliter*.
[7] Ope antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus a Vat. additum *ergo*. Paulo intra post *sensibilium* cod. O omittit *et* moxque cod. M loco *retentiva* ponit *receptiva*.
[8] Vers. 37. Expositionem huius loci, non solum a S. Bonaventura, sed etiam a S. Thomas (III. Sent. d. 37. expos. textus) Augustino adscriptam, non potuimus invenire in ipsius operibus. S. Thomas in Catena aurea (Matt. 22, 37.) eam attribuit Glossae interlineari, in qua sic legitur: Ex toto corde, id est intellectu, ut nullam in confessione divinitatis relinquae errori locum; in tota anima, id est voluntate, ut nihil ei contrarium velis, in tota mente, nihil reminiscens quo minus de eo sentias. — Tam in libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 35, quam in libr. de Diligendo Deo, c. 2, qui inter opera S. Augustini recensebantur, simpliciter dicitur: Id est ex toto intellectu tuo et ex tota voluntate tua et ex tota memoria tua.
[9] In Cant. Cant. Serm. 11. n. 5. — Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *quia* loco *quod*.
[10] Ope mss. et ed. 1 delevimus *etiam*. Paulo post cod. T *prior* loco *prima*.
[11] Vat. *formationis*, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1, qui etiam paulo post omittunt *reformatio*, quod tamen claritatis gratia non expunximus. Vide plura infra in Scholio ad hanc quaestionem.

reason it is said to be through an ap- / -propriation in the will or in dilection.

[1] Chapter 39: The rational soul and the intellect have been made to the image and similitude of God, that one may cognize his Maker in virtue of (His) image [pro imagine], and love (Him) in virtue of His similitude [pro similitudine diligat]. For from the image of God it has reason and from (His) similitude charity.
[2] The Vatican edition contrary to many codices, as A C F G H I K T etc. and edition 1 reads *anything* [quidquid].
[3] Here in ch. 2. — A little after this the Vatican edition has *with* [cum] in place of *however (this is) in* [tamen in], but less clearly [signanter] and contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
[4] The corrupted reading of the Vatican edition, *love according to what is understood to be good* [amandum secundum quod intelligitur esse bonum], we have emended with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1.
[5] Very many codices as A T etc. and edition 1 have *the other* [aliud] in place of *that* [illud].
[6] We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 *this* [haec]. A little before this after *virtue* [virtus] there is added in codex A *in an intelligible manner* [intelligibiliter].
[7] With the help of the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged from the Vatican edition the added *therefore* [ergo]. A little below this after *of sensibles* [sensibilium] codex O omits *and* [et] and then codex M puts *receptive* [receptiva] in place of *retentive* [retentiva].
[8] Verse 37. The exposition of this passage, ascribed to (St.) Augustine not only by St. Bonaventure, but also by St. Thomas (Sent., Bk. III, d. 27, exposition of the text), we could not find among the former's works. St. Thomas in the Catena Aurea, Mt. 22:37, attributes it to the Glossa interlinearis, in which it reads thus: With (thy) whole heart, that is with the intellect, so that you leave no place for error in (your) confession of (His) Divinity; in (thy) whole soul, that is with the will, so that you will nothing contrary to Him, in (thy) whole mind, reminiscing nothing whereby you may think [sentias] less of him. — Both in the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 35, and in the book On Loving God, ch. 2, which are reckoned among the works of St. Augustine, there is said simply: That is with thy whole intellect and with thy whole will and with thy whole memory.
[9] In his Commentary on the Song of Songs, Sermon 11, n. 5. — The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *that* [quia] in place of *that* [quod].
[10] With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have deleted *also* [etiam]. A little after this codex T has *prior* [prior] in place of *first* [prima].
[11] The Vatican edition reads *formation* [formationis], but this is opposed to the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, which a little after this also omit *reformation* [reformatio], which for the sake of clarity we have not expunged. See the many things below in the Scholium regarding this question.

per ap- / -propriationem in voluntate sive in dilectione. Imago vero non dicit gratuitum, et[1] ideo dicitur esse in potentia cognoscendi.

through ap- / -propriation in the will or in dilection. But "the image" does not mean "the gratuitous", and[1] for that reason it is said to be in the power of cognizing.

Vel aliter de imagine: quia in Filio est propria[2] imago, et Filio appropriatur intelligentia, quae est in potentia cognitiva; ideo dicitur imago esse in potentia cognoscendi.

And/or otherwise concerning the image: because in the Son there is a proper[2] image, and to the Son is appropriated intelligence, which is in the cognitive power; for that reason the image is said to be in the power of cognizing.

6. Ad illud:[3] Voluntas non aequatur intelligentiae; dicendum, quod voluntas, prout communiter accipitur ad velle et nolle, quorum utrumque est actus voluntatis, bene aequatur, secundum quod dicitur *uti* esse commmune ad utrumque, sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera,[4] quod voluntas capit alia, dum utor etc. Quidquid enim recordamur vel intelligimus, in facultatem voluntatis accipimus ad eligendum vel ad respuendum; et istud est, secundum quod dicit actum *communem* voluntatis;[5] sed secundum actum *specialem*, qui est velle tantum, non aequatur; et de isto opponitur, quia[6] *sic* velle non comprehendit totam voluntatem, sicut meminisse totam memoriam et intelligere totam intelligentiam.

6. To that:[3] The will is not equal to the intelligence; it must be said, that the will, insofar as it is commonly accepted for willing and not-willing, each of which is an act of the will, is well an equal [bene aequatur], according to which *to use* is said to be common to each, just as (St.) Augustine says and as is had in the text (of Master Peter),[4] that the will seizes the others, while it uses etc.. For anything we think of [recordamur] and/or understand, we accept into the faculty of the will to be chosen and/or rejected; and that is, according to this that it means a *common* act of the will;[5] but according to a *special* act, which is willing only, it is not equal; and from that it is opposed, because[6] willing *in this manner* does not comprehend the whole will, as forgetting (does) the whole memory and understanding the whole intelligence.

SCHOLION.

I. In responsione duplex est propositio. *Prima* est ipsa conclusio principalis, quae dicit, quod imago summae Trinitatis consistit in dictis tribus animae potentiis, quatenus includunt et unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum secundorum. *Secunda* propositio, quae illam explicat et probat, est haec: sicut in divinis personis est et *distinctio* et *ordo* et *origo*, ita etiam in actibus harum potentiarum haec tria inveniuntur. Nam actus earum realiter distinguuntur; porro memoriae actus sive retentio speciei *disponit* ad intelligendum et intelligentia ad amandum. Unde ex memoria quasi procedit actus intellectus, et

SCHOLIUM

II. In the response there is a twofold proposition. The *first* is the principle conclusion itself, which says, that the image of the Most High Trinity consists in the said three powers of the soul, to the extent that they include both unity of essence and plurality of second acts. The *second* proposition, which explicates and proves that, is this: just as among the Divine Persons there is both *distinction* and *order* and *origin*, so also among the acts of these powers are these three found. For their acts are really distinguished; further the act of memory or the retention of species *disposes* to understanding and understanding to

ex memoria et intellectu amor.

loving. Whence from the memory there quasi proceeds the act of the intellect, and from the memory and the intellect love.

Triplex illa distinctio memoriae (in solut. ad 3.) invenitur etiam apud Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. et Petr. a. Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1.

That threefold distinction of memory (in solution to n. 3) is found also in Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7 and in (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here at q. 5, a. 1.

II. In solut. ad 4. dicitur cum sententia tunc communi, quod memoria reformatur in statu viae per *spem*, in statu gloriae per *tentionem*. Rationem, cur spes attribuatur memoriae, S. Doctor exhibet II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., scil. « quia habent conformitatem in actu, qui est *tenere* ». — Verba ibidem posita: « Ordo reformationis et deformationis incipit a posteriori » hunc sensum habent: *deformatio* imaginis per culpam et *reformatio* per gratiam incipit a voluntate, quae in ordine potentiarum est ultima sive posterior, quia *actus* voluntatis praesupponit actum intellectus, et hic actum memoriae, si memoria sumitur in tertio sensu, immediate antea explicato. In hoc sensu memoria est prior et intimior et per consequens *superior*. Nam « in anima humana idem est intimum et supremum » (II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2). In ordine vero *formationis* sive *informationis* hae tres potentiae consistunt ipsam vitam spiritualem quasi per modum formae informantis; et sic memoria est prima potentia, et in hoc sensu informatio incipit ab ipsa. Pro explicatione cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 5. praesertim ad 4. — Ad obiect. 5. duplex datur responsio; de prima cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

II. In the solution to n. 4 there is said with the then sententia communis, that the memory is reformed in the state of way through *hope*, in the state of glory through *grasping*. The reason, why hope is attributed to the memory, the Seraphic Doctor exhibits in Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3 in the body, that is « because they have a conformity in act, which is *holding* ». — The words posited in the same place: « The order of reformation and of deformation begins from the posterior » have this sense: the *deformation* of the image through fault and the *reformation* through grace begin from the will, which in the order of powers is the last or the posterior, because the *act* of the will presupposes the act of the intellect, and here the act of the memory, if "memory" is taken in the third sense, has been explained immediately before this. In this sense the memory is prior and more innermost [intimior] and consequently *superior*. For « in the human soul the same is most interior and supreme » (Sent., Bk. III, d. 8, p. II, q. 2). But in the order of *formation* or *information* these three powers consist of the spiritual life itself as if through a manner of informing form; and so the memory is the first power, and in this sense information begins from it. For an explanation cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 26, a. 1. q. 5 chiefly in n. 4. — To objection 5 a twofold response is given; concerning the first cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

III. Quoad rationem imaginis vide infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1 et Schol. Alia plura, quae in hac et seqq. qq. occurrunt, exponuntur et probantur ab ipso S. Doctore II. Sent. d. 16; Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; Itinerar. mentis, c. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. et 4; II. Sent. d. 16; S. I. q. 93 praesertim a. 5. 6. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. a. 62. m. 5. a. 6 et 7. — Scot., hic. q. 9. et Report. hic q. 7. — Albert., hic a. 19; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. supp. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 40. q. 7. n.

III. In regard to the reckoning of the image see below in d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 and the Scholium. The other very many things, which occur in this and the following questions, are expounded and proven by the Seraphic Doctor himself in Sent., d. 16; Breviloquium, p. II, ch. 12; Itinerarium mentis, ch. 4. — St. Thomas, here in q. 3 & 4; Sent., Bk II, d. 16; Summa., I, q. 93, chiefly in a. 5 & 6. — A lexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 6 and 7. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 9 and in the Reportatio, here in q. 7. — Bl. (now St.)

16. — Durand., hic. p. II. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 10.

Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 19; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2. supposition n. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 5, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in p. II, a. 1, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in n. 2. at the beginning of q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 40, q. 7, n. 16. — Durandus, here in p. II, q. 1. — (Bl) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 8. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 10.

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[1] Fide mss. restituimus particulam *et*.
[2] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *prima*. Cod. R *quia enim in Filio proprie est imago*. Mox codd. P Q *cognitiva* loco *cognoscendi*.
[3] Plures codd. ut X Y hic addunt *quod*, alii ut B I aa bb *quod obiicitur quod*.
[4] Hic. c. 2, circa medium, iuxta quem textum et ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus hoc loco *illam* in *alia*, scilicet intelligentiam et memoriam. — Mox multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt particulam *enim*.
[5] Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
[6] Ita mss. cum ed. 1, licet aliqui loco *quia* minus bene habeant *quod*, sed Vat.: *De isto est oppositio, quo modo sic*.

[1] Trusting in the manuscripts we have restored the particle *and* [et].
[2] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 reads *the prime* [prima]. Codex R reads *for because in the Son properly there is an image* [quia enim in Filio proprie est imago]. Then codices P and Q have *the cognitive power* [potentia cognitiva] in place of *the power of cognizing* [potentia cognoscendi].
[3] Very many codices as X and Y here add *that* [quod], others as B I aa and bb *which is objected that* [quod obiicitur quod].
[4] Here in ch. 2, near the middle, according to which text and with the help of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have changed in this passage *that* [illam] into *the others* [alia], that is the intelligence and the memory. — Then many codices together with edition 1 omit the particle *for* [enim].
[5] Cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
[6] Thus the manuscripts together with edition 1, though others in place of *because* [quia] have less well *because* [quod], but the Vatican edition: *From that there is opposition, in what manner willing in this manner* [De isto est opposition, quo modo sic].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. II.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 82-84.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum imago attendatur in his potentiis per comparationem ipsarum ad Deum.

SECONDO QUAERITUR de potentiis in comparatione ad obiectum, utrum videlicet imago in eis per comparationem ipsarum ad Deum.[7] Et quod sic, videtur.

1. « Eo est anima imago, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest », ut dicit Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate;[8] sed est capax quantum ad partem superiorem: ergo etc.

2. Item, in eodem:[9] « Imago illius, quo nihil melius est, ibi quaerenda est et invenienda, quo mens nostra nihil melius habet »; sed hoc est superior pars: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc idem videtur *ratione*, quia imago dicitur eo quod ducit in prototypum:[10] ergo cum illud sit Deus, non attenditur imago in his potentiis, . . .

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[7] Cod. X addit *tantum vel etiam attendatur in eis per conversionem animae supra se vel etiam per conversionem ipsius super inferiora. Et videtur primo per comparationem ad Deum*. Deinde post *videtur* expunximus *quia* ope plurimorum codd. et ed. 1.

[8] Cap. 8. n. 11; vide hic in lit. Magistri, cap. 2.

[9] Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11: Imago tamen naturae eius, qua natura melior nulla est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est in nobis, quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius. — In his verbis Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 ponit *inquirenda* loco *ibi quaerenda*. Plures codd. cum ed. 1 paulo post *haec* loco *hoc*.

[10] Ian. Damasc., Orat. 1. de Imag. ait: Imago itaque est similitudo exemplar (□□□□□□□□□□) ita exprimens, ut aliqua ratione tamen ab eo differat. Et ibid. Orat. 3: Imago itaque est similitudo, exemplum

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART II

ARTICLE I

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 82-84.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 2

Whether the image is attained in these powers through their comparison to God.

SECOND THRE IS ASKED concerning the powers in comparison to (their) object, whether namely (there is) an image in them through their comparison to God.[7] And it seems that (this is) so:

1. « For this reason the soul is the image, whereby one can be able to seize God and be a partaker (in Him) », as (St.) Augustine says in the fourteenth chapter of On the Trinity;[8] but one is able to seize as much as regards one's superior part: ergo etc..

2. Likewise in the same (book):[9] « The image of Him, than which nothing is better, is to be sought and found there, where our mind has nothing better »; but this is the superior part: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, this seems to be the same by *reason*, because "image" is said by this that it leads unto a prototype:[10] therefore since That is God, there is not attained in these powers an image, . . .

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[7] Codex X adds *only and/or also attained in them through conversion of the soul upon itself and/or also through conversion of itself upon inferiors. And it seems first through a comparison to God* [*tantum vel etiam attendatur in eis per conversionem animae supra se vel etiam per conversionem ipsius super inferiora. Et videtur primo per comparationem ad Deum*]. Then after *it seems* we have expunged *that* [quia] with the help of very many of the codices and edition 1.

[8] Chapter 8, n. 11; see the text of Master (Peter), here in chapter 2.

[9] On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, ch. 8, n. 11: However the image of His nature, than which no nature is better, is to be sought and found there in us, where even our nature has nothing better. — In these words the

et effigies cuiuspiam, in qua ille cuius est ostenditur.

Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 puts *to be found* [inquirenda] in place of *to be sought . . . there* [ibi quaerenda]. Very many codices together with edition 1 have a little after this have *this* [haec] in place of *this* [hoc].

[10] (St.) John Damascene, On Images, Oration 1, says: And so the image is a similitude expressing the exemplar (□□□□□□□□□□) in such a manner [ita], however, that it differs from it in some reckoning. And ibid., Oration 3: And so the image is a similitude, example and effigy of something, in which that of which it is, is shown.

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nisi secundum quod ducunt in Deum; sed per has potentias homo ducitur in Deum, dum per eas convertitur in eum: ergo etc.

except according to which they lead into God; but through these powers man is lead into God, so long as through them he is converted unto Him: ergo etc..

4. Item, Deus est obiectum virtutum theologicarum, in quibus consistit imago reformationis: ergo, cum idem sit obiectum utriusque imaginis, quia una est ductiva[1] alterius et perfectiva, si Deus est obiectum unius, et alterius.

4. Likewise, God is the object of the theological virtues, in which consist the image of reformation: therefore, since the same is the object of each image, because one is ductive[1] of the other and perfective, if God is the object of one, (He is) also of the other.

Contra: 1. Augustinus nono de Trinitate[2] assignat imaginem in mente, notitia et amore, secundum quod anima meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se: ergo videtur, quod imago attendatur per conversionem sui supra se.

On the contrary: 1. (St.) Augustine in the ninth (book) of On the Trinity[2] assigns the image in mind, knowledge [notitia] and love, according to which the soul remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself: therefore it seems, that the image is attained through conversion of itself upon itself.

2. Item, Augustinus duodecimo de Trinitate, capitulo quarto:[3] « Cum in natura mentis humanae quaerimus trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem temporalium a contemplatione aeternorum, ut tertium aliquid iam quaeramus »: ergo trinitas imaginis attenditur secundum actionem temporalium, et ita per conversionem ad inferiora.

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the twelfth (book) of On the Trinity, in the fourth chapter:[3] « Since we seek a trinity in the nature of the human mind, let us seek in the whole, not separating the action of temporals from the contemplation of eternals, so that we might still seek a third something »: therefore the trinity of the image is attained according to the action of temporals, and thus through a conversion toward inferiors.

3. Item, secundum quod anima convertitur supra inferiora vel supra se, in ipsa[4] est aequalitas et ordo et origo et omnia, quae concurrunt ad rationem imaginis.

3. Likewise, according to which the soul is converted upon inferiors and/or upon itself, in that[4] there is an equality and order and origin and all things, which concur for the reckoning of the image.

4. Item, imago est in peccatoribus a Deo aversis, et in illis etiam qui nullo modo possunt reverti, ut sunt damnati: ergo ratio imaginis non attenditur penes conversionem ad Deum.

4. Likewise, the image is in sinners turned away from God, and in them also who in no manner can be turned back (to Him), as are the damned: therefore the reckoning of the image is not attained from within [penes] conversion to God.

5. Item, necesse est, quantum ad perfectam rationem imaginis aequari cognoscentem et cognitum, sive dicentem et dictum; nam ista duo Patrem et Filium repraesentant; sed in conversione ad Deum non est talis aequatio: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, it is necessary, as much as regards the perfect reckoning of the image that the one cognizing and the one cognized be equal, or the one saying and the one said; for those two represent the Father and the Son; but in conversion to God there is not such an equation [aequatio]: ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Imago primo et principaliter est in potentiis animae, quatenus convertuntur in Deum; secundario vero in eis, quatenus convertuntur ad ipsam animam; quatenus vero convertuntur ad inferiora, non est in eis imago, sed tantum vestigium Trinitatis.

CONCLUSION

The image first and principally is in the powers of the soul, to the extent that they are converted unto God; but secondarily in them, to the extent they are converted toward the soul itself; but to the extent they are converted to inferiors, there is not in them an image, but only a vestige of the Trinity.

Respondeo: Ad intelligentiam praedictorum tria oportet in imaginis ratione praesupponere: *primo* enim imago attenditur secundum expressam conformitatem ad imaginatum; *secundo*, quod illud quod conformatur imagini, per consequens conformetur[5] imaginato; unde qui videt imaginem Petri, per consequens videt et Petrum; *tertio*, quod anima secundum suas potentias conformis reddatur his ad quae convertitur, sive secundum cognitionem, sive secundum amorem.

Quoniam igitur, cum anima convertitur ad Deum, sibi conformatur, et imago attenditur secundum conformitatem: ideo imago Dei consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod[6] habent obiectum Deum.

Rursum, quoniam anima est imago Dei, et quod convertitur et conformatur imagini, et imaginato,[7] ideo anima, secundum quod convertitur supra se, non recedit a conformitate; et ideo imago consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod habent animam pro obiecto.

I respond: For an understanding of the aforesaid it is proper to presuppose three (things) in the reckoning of an image: for *first* an image is attained according to an express conformity to the one imaged; *second*, that that which is conformed to the image, consequently is conformed[5] to the one imaged; whence he who sees the image of Peter, consequently sees also Peter; *third*, that the souls according to its powers is rendered conform [conformis] to these to which it is converted, either according to (its) cognition, or according to (its) love.

Therefore since, when the soul is converted to God, it is conformed to itself, and the image is attained according to the conformity: for that reason the image of God consists in this powers, according to which[6] they have (as their) object God.

Again, since the soul is the image of God, and because it is converted and conformed to the image, and to the one imaged,[7] for that reason the soul, according to which it is converted upon itself, does not recede from conformity; and for that reason the image does consist in these powers, according to this that they have the soul for an object.

Sed cum convertitur ad creaturas inferiores, illis conformatur, in quibus non est imago Dei, sed vestigium. Ideo[8] potentiae animae, secundum quod habent inferiora pro obiectis, recedunt a ratione imaginis, quia recedunt a conformitate expressa.

But when it is converted to inferior creatures, it is conformed to them, in which there is not an image of God, but (rather) a vestige. For that reason[8] the powers of the soul, according to which they have inferiors for objects, recede from the reckoning of the image, because they recede from (their) express conformity.

Licet itaque in huiusmodi potentiis, secundum quod convertuntur ad inferiora, sit reperire trinitatem et aliquam conformitatem, similiter et in potentiis sensitivis, sicut ostendit Augustinus;[9] quia tamen deficiunt ab expressa conformitate, non reperitur ratio imaginis in eis. Unde Augustinus investigat in omnibus potentiis animae trinitatem, non quia in eis sit imago, sed ut a ratione imaginis excludat. Unde quaerens totam[10] trinitatem in tota anima, quaerit eam in superiori et inferiori parte rationis et in sensu. Et hoc est quod dicit in illa auctoritate: « Cum in natura mentis humane quaerimus *trinitatem*, in tota quaerimus »; non dicit quaerimus *imaginem*. Unde Augustinus duodecimo de Trinitate, capitulo quarto:[11] « Quamvis in inferiori parte rationis inveniri trinitas possit, imago tamen inveniri non potest ».

And so though in powers of this kind, according to which they are converted toward inferiors, there is a discovering of a trinity and some conformity, similarly also in the sensitive powers, as (St.) Augustine shows;[9] however because they lack [deficiunt ab] an express conformity, the reckoning of the image is not found in them. Whence (St.) Augustine investigates among all the powers of the soul for a trinity, not because the image is in them, but to exclude (them) from the reckoning of the image. Whence seeking the whole[10] trinity in the whole soul, he seeks it in the superior and inferior part of the reason and in the sense. And this is what he says in that authority: « When in the nature of the human mind we seek a *trinity*, we seek it in the whole »; he does not say "we seek the *image*." Whence (St.) Augustine in the twelfth (book of) On the Trinity, in the fourth chapter:[11] « Although in the inferior part of reason a trinity can be found, however the image cannot be found ».

Concedendum est ergo, quod imago consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod ad animam convertuntur, primo tamen et principaliter, ut ostendunt primae rationes, secundum quod convertuntur ad Deum. Unde Augustinus his duobus modis assignat imaginem: prima est in mente, notitia et amore, . . .

It must be conceded therefore, that the image consists in these powers, according to which they are converted toward the soul, however first and principally, as they show the first reasons, according to which they are converted toward God. Whence (St.) Augustine in these two manners assigns the image: first it is in mind, knowledge and love, . . .

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[1] Aliqui codd. ut F M Y cum ed. 1 *directiva* loco *ductiva*. Cod. K (a secunda manu) *ductiva vel directiva in cognitionem alterius*. Mox Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 post *perfectiva* addit *propterea* et post *unius* adiungit *ergo*.

[2] Cap. 4. n. 4, in cuius imaginis assignatione Vat. tum contra textum Augustini tum contra mss. et ed. 1 loco *notitia* ponit *intellectu*.

[3] Num. 4, in quo textu loco *temporalium* in originali legitur *rationalem in temporalibus*.

[4] Sequimur codd. D F T adiungendo manifest supplendum *in ipsa*.

[5] Vat. *conformatur* et paulo post *redditur*.

[6] Restituimus meliorem lectionem mss. et ed. 1 loco

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[1] Some codices as F M Y together with edition 1 have *directive* [directiva] in place of *ductive* [ductiva]. Codex K (by a second hand) has *ductive and/or directive in the cognition of the other* [ductiva vel directive in cognitionem alterius]. Then the Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 after *perfective* [perfectiva] adds *moreover* [praeterea] and after *of one* [unius] adjoins *therefore* [ergo].

[2] Chapter 4, n. 4, in the assignment of which image the Vatican edition both contrary to the text of (St.) Augustine and contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 puts *understanding* [intellectu] in place of *knowledge* [notitia].

quae ponendo *secundum quod*. Paulo ante in multis codd., ut A F G H K T etc. post *imago* abest *Dei*.
[7] Ita maior pars codd. B D E H I K V W etc. cum ed. 1; alii omittunt vel *convertitur et* vel *et conformatur*. Vat. autem contra omnes codd. ponit *et secundum quod conformatur imagini*; codd. L O Y elipsim explendo post *imagini* addunt *conformatur*
[8] Aliqui codd. ut A T bb cum ed. 1 addunt *ergo*.
[9] Augustini opinionem de trinitate in potentiis animae ad inferiora conversis vide XII. de Trin., et de trinitate in potentiis sensitivis ibid. libr. XI. — Paulo ante post *similiter* a Vat. indebite omissam particulam *et* revocavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.
[10] Supplevimus ex mss. *totam*.
[11] Num. 4: In hoc autem quod derivatum est in actione temporalium, etiamsi trinitas possit, non tamen imago Dei pssit inveniari.

[3] Number 4, in which text in place of *action of temporals* [temporalium] there is read in the original *rational action among temporals* [rationalem in temporalibus].
[4] We follow codices D F T by adjoining the manifestly to be supplied *in that* [in ipsa].
[5] The Vatican edition has the indicative *conformed* [conformatur] and a little after this the indicative *rendered* [redditur].
[6] We have restored the better reading of the manuscripts and edition 1 by putting *according to which* [secundum quod] in place of *which* [quae]. A little before this in many codices, as A F G H K T etc. after *image* [imago] there is absent *of God* [Dei].
[7] Thus the greater part of the codices B D E H I K V W etc. together with edition 1; the others omit *converted and* and/or *and conformed* [convertitur et]. But the Vatican edition against all the codices has *and according to which it is conformed to the image* [et secundum quod conformatur imagini]; codices L O Y by filling the ellipsis after *to the image* [imagini] add *it is conformed* [conformatur].
[8] Some codices as A T bb together with edition 1 add *therefore* [ergo].
[9] For (St.) Augustine's opinion concerning the trinity in the powers of the soul turned toward inferiors, see On the Trinity, Bk. XII, and on the trinity in the sensitive powers ibid., Bk. XI. — A little before this after *similarly* [similiter] the particle *and* [et], unduly omitted from the Vatican edition, we have recalled from the manuscripts and edition 1.
[10] We have supplied from the manuscripts *the whole* [totam].
[11] Number 4: But in this that it has been derived in the action of temporals, even if there can be a trinity, the image of God, however, cannot be found.

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secundum quod mens novit et amat se; secunda est in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate. Et in fine libri ostendit, completissimam rationem imaginis esse in comparatione ad Deum.[1]

according to which the mind knows and loves itself; the second is in the memory, intelligence and will. And at the end of the book he shows, that the most complete reckoning of the image is in (their) comparison to God.[1]

1. 2. 3. Ex his patet responsio ad primum et secundum et tertium: quia primum argumentum concedendum est, secundum vero concludit, quod in inferiori parte sit trinitas, et tertium, quod conformitas; sed haec soluta sunt, quia non est expressa.

1. 2. 3. From these the response to the first and second and third is clear: because the first argument must be conceded, but the second concludes, that in the inferior part there is a trinity, and the third, that (there is) a conformity; but these have been explained [soluta], because it is not an express (image).

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de aversione peccatorum, solvendum,[2] quod non dicimus imaginem in his potentiis secundum conversionem *actualem*, sed *aptitudinalem*

4. To that which is objected concerning the aversion of sinners, it must be explained [solvendum],[2] that we do not speak of an image in these powers according to (their)

quae nunquam reliquit potentias: sicut gressibilis etiam dicitur homo, qui habet pedes truncatos, quamvis non gradiatur.

actual conversion, but (rather according to their) *aptitudinal* (conversion), which never leaves the powers: just as a man is also said to be able to take steps [gressibilis], who has truncated feet, even though he does not take steps.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necesse est, in imagine cognoscens et cognitum adaequari; dicendum, quod non oportet, cognitum adaequari cognoscenti adaequatione *rei ad rem*, sed sub *ratione cognoscibilis*. Unde tantum est cognitum in intelligentia, quantum repraesentatur a memoria. Quod autem simpliciter adaequetur non oportet; adaequatur tamen, secundum quod anima convertitur supra se. Unde ratio imaginis quoad quid est plus in conversione animae supra se. In conversione ad Deum est plus, quia plus habet de ratione venustatis et conformitatis; in conversione ad se plus habet de ratione consubstantialitatis et aequalitatis.

5. To that which is objected, that is it necessary, in an image that the one cognizing and the one cognized be equal; it must be said, that it is not proper, that the one cognized be equal to the one cognizing by an adequation of *thing to thing*, but (rather) under a *reckoning of the cognizable*. Whence there is only a cognized in intelligence, as much as it is represented by memory. But it is not proper that it be simply adequated; however it is adequated, according to which the soul is converted upon itself. Whence the reckoning of the image in regard to that is more in the conversion of the soul upon itself. In the conversion toward God it is more, because it has more of the reckoning of loveliness [venustatis] and of conformity; in conversion toward itself it has more a reckoning of consubstantiality and equality.

SCHOLION.

I. Distintio rationis in partem superiorem et inferiorem in corp. accipitur non ex parte ipsius *potentiae*, sed ex parte *obiecti*, quatenus anima attingit vel obiecta exteriora et inferiora, vel interiora et superiora, sive ut dicit S. Doctor: « Non est differentia nisi secundum aspectum », II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2., cfr. etiam ibidem p. II. a. 1. q. 1; Breviloq. p. I. c. 12; Itinerar. mentis., c. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 79. a. 9. et 10; de Verit., q. 15. a. 1 et 2.

II. Quoad ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 5. §. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 22; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. subp. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Ceteros vide in Scholio praecedenti.

SCHOLIUM

I. The distinction of reckoning among the superior and inferior part, in the body (of the question), is accepted not on the part of the *power*, but on the part of the *object*, to the extent that the soul attains the exterior and inferior object, and/or the interior and superior, or as the Seraphic Doctor says: « There is no difference except according to aspect », Sent., d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, cf. also ibid. p. II, a. 1, q. 1; Breviloquium., p. I. ch. 12; Itinerarium mentis, ch. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I. q. 2. m. 3, a. 3. — St. Thomas, Summa., I. q. 79, a. 9 and 10; De Veritate., q. 15, a. 1 and 2.

II. In regard to the question itself: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 5 §. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 22; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2 subp. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 5, a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1. q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here at 2nd princ., q. 3. — See the others in the Scholium of the preceding (question).

[1] De prima assignatione vide IX. de Trin. per totum; de secunda ibid. X. c. 11. et 12; de completissima imaginis ratione ibid. XIV. c. 8. ac 12. seqq.
[2] Vat. contra mss. *respondeo*.

[1] Concerning the first impression see On the Trinity, Bk. IX throughout; concerning the second ibid., Bk. X, ch. 11 and 12; concerning the most complete reckoning of the image ibid., Bk. XIV, ch. 8 and 12 ff..

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. II.
ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 84-88.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART II
ARTICLE I

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 84-88.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint idem in essentia cum anima.

Tertio loco quaeritur de comparatione istarum potentiarum ad animam sive ad[3] subiectum, utrum videlicet sint idem in essentia cum anima. Et videtur quod sic.

1. Augustinus dicit in decimo de Trinitate:[4] « Haec tria, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una vita, una essentia, ac per hoc una substantia ».

QUESTION 3

Whether memory, intelligence and will are the same in essence with the soul.

In the third place there is asked concerning the comparison of those powers (of the soul) to the soul or to[3] (their) subject, whether namely they are the same in essence with the soul. And it seems that (it is) so.

1. (St.) Augustine says in the tenth (book of) On the Trinity:[4] « These three, memory, intelligence and will are one mind, one life, one essence, and through this one

substance ».

2. Item, Bernardus super Cantica:[5] « Tria quaedam in anima intueor, memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, et haec tria ipsam ». *Si tu dicas*, quod hoc dicitur per causam; hoc nihil est, quia Augustinus de Spiritu et anima[6] dicit, quod anima « est quaedam sua, ut potentiae, et quaedam non sua, ut virtutes »; quod si per causam esset dictum, utrumque posset dici.

2. Likewise, (St.) Bernard in On the Song of Songs:[5] « I intuit a certain three in the soul, memory, intelligence and will, and that these three (are the soul) itself ». *If you say*, that this is said by way of [per] a cause; this is nothing, because (St.) Augustine in On the Spirit and the Soul[6] says, that the soul « is a certain its-own, as powers, and a certain not-its-own, as virtues »; which if it were said by way of a cause, each could be said.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur velle dicere Philosophus,[7] quia idem dicit esse principium essendi et operandi: ergo cum principium essendi sit ipsa forma substantialis, principium operandi erit ipsa; sed principium operandi est potentia: ergo potentia est principium essendi; sed non est principium essendi nisi forma substantialis in homine: ergo potentia et forma substantialis sunt idem in substantia.

3. Likewise, this itself the Philosopher seems to want to say,[7] because he says the same is the principle of being [principium essendi] and of operating: therefore since the principle of being is the substantial form itself, the principle of operating will be that itself [ipsa]; but the principle of operating is a power: therefore a power is the principle of being; but there is not a principle of being in man except the substantial form: therefore a power and the substantial form are the same in substance.

4. Item, *ratione* ostenditur: Sicut materia prima nata est recipere omnia per veritatem, sic anima secundum similitudinem;[8] sed potentia materiae primae respectu formarum suscipiendarum non differt per essentiam ab ipsa:[9] ergo similiter videtur, quod potentia animae. *Probatio*: si enim per essentiam differret, aut esset *substantia*, aut *accidens*. Non accidens, quia antecedit omnem formam et omne / accidens;

4. Likewise, it is shown *by reason*: Just as prime matter is bound to receive all through truth, so the soul according to similitude;[8] but the power of prime matter in respect to forms to be received [suscipiendarum] does not differ by [per] essence from it:[9] therefore it similarly seems, that the power of the soul (is thus related). *Proof*: for if it would differ by essence, either it would be a *substance*, or an *accident*. Not an accident, because it antecedes every form and every / accident;

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[3] Cod. O addit *suum*.
[4] Cap. 11. n. 18. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2 in initio.
[5] Serm. 11. In fine textus citati supple cum ed. operum Bernardi *animam esse*. Vat. in initio huius textus omittit *Tria* et circa finem legit *haec tria ipsa est*.
[6] Cap. 13: Deus est omnia sua, et anima quaedam sua. Habet siquidem naturalia et ipsa omnia est. Potentiae namque eius et vires idem sunt quod ipsa. Habet accidentalia, et ipsa non est. Suae vires est, suae virtutes non est. — In fine argumenti Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit *dictum*.
[7] Vide Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28. (c. 3); VII. Metaph. text. 59. 60. (VI. c. 17.) et VIII. Metaph. text. 8. (VII. c. 3.) ac II. de Anima, text. 2, ubi docet, formam substantialem esse principium essendi, in quantum scil. sua actualitate dat esse rei remque in certa specie constituit; II. Phys. text. 11. seqq. (c. 1.), ubi asserit, formam substantialem esse *naturam* i. e.

[3] Codex O adds *their own* [suum].
[4] Chapter 11, n. 18. See also here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2 at the beginning.
[5] Sermon 11. At the end of the text cited supply together with the edition of Works of St. Bernard is *are the soul* [animam esse]. The Vatican edition at the beginning of this text omits *three* [Tria] and near the end reads *and it itself is these three* [haec tria ipsa est].
[6] Chapter 13: God is all His own, and the soul a certain its-own. If indeed it has natural (powers) and is itself all (things). For its powers and strengths [vires] are the same (as) what it itself (is). It has accidentals, and it itself is not (these). It is its own strengths, it is not its own virtues. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 omits *said* [dictum].
[7] See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 28 (ch. 3); Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 59 & 60 (Bk. VI, ch. 17) and Bk. VIII, text 8 (Bk. VII, ch. 3) and On the Soul, Bk. II,

principium motus et quiestis; II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.), ubi animam ut formam substantialem describet: id quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligemus primo.

[8] Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima text. 17. et 37. seqq. (c. 5. et 8.).

[9] Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. seq. (c. ult.); VIII. Metaph. text. 3. seqq. et XII. text. 26. (VII. c. 1. et XI. c. 5.). Ita docet Averroes, in libr. de Substantia orbis. — Mox post *quod* substituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *potentia* loco *potentiae*. Dein post *Probatio* Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit *minoris*.

text 2, where he teaches, that the substantial form is the principle of being, inasmuch as, that is, by its own actuality it gives the "being" of a thing and constitutes it in a certain species; Physics, Bk. II, text 11 ff. (ch. 1), where he asserts, that the substantial form is the *nature*, i. e. the principle of moving and resting; On the Soul, Bk. II, text 24 (ch. 2), where he describes the soul as the substantial form: that by which we live and sense and are moved and understand first [primo].

[8] Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 17 and 37 ff. (ch. 5 and 8).

[9] Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 81 ff. (last ch.); Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, text 3 ff. and Bk. XII, text 26 (Bk. VII, ch. 1 and Bk. XI, ch. 5). Thus does Averroës teach, in his book On the Substance of the Globe. — Then after *that* [quod] we have substituted from the manuscripts and edition 1 *power* [potentia] in place of *of the power* [potentiae]. Then after *Proof* [Probatio] the Vatican edition contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 adds *of the minor* [minoris].

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accidens; si *substantia*, aut ergo materia, aut forma. Praeterea, si differret, illius esset materia capax.[1]

accident; if a *substance*, therefore either matter, or form. Moreover, if it would differ, (power) would be a capable matter for it.[1]

5. Item, forma accidentalis non est simplicior forma substantiali; sed potentia operandi non differt a forma accidentali, utpote potentia calefaciendi non differt per essentiam a caliditate, nec potentia illuminandi ab ipsa luce: ergo similiter videtur, quod nec potentia animae ab ipsa anima.

5. Likewise, the accidental form is not more simple than the substantial form; but the power of operating does not differ from the accidental form, as for example [utpote], the power of making warm does not differ by essence from warmth, nor the power of illuminating from light itself: therefore it similarly seems, that neither does the power of the soul from the soul itself.

6. Item, quod est accidens, nulli substantiae est substantiale;[2] sed potentiae istae sunt substantiales: ergo animae non sunt accidentia:[3] ergo sunt substantia; constat quod non alia quam anima. *Probatio minoris*: quia anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis in homine non dicit diversitatem substantiarum, sed potentiarum: ergo constat, quod in homine istae differentiae: *vegetabile*, *sensiblile*, *rationale*, accipiuntur a potentiis; sed[4] huiusmodi differentiae sunt substantiales: ergo et potentiae: ergo etc.

6. Likewise, what is an accident, is substantial of no substance;[2] but its powers are substantial: therefore they are not accidents of the soul:[3] therefore they are substances; it is established that (they are) not other than the soul. *Proof of the minor*: because in man the rational, sensible, vegetable soul does not mean a diversity of substances, but of powers: therefore it is established, that in man these differences: *vegetable*, *sensible*, *rational*, are accepted as powers; but[4] differences of this kind are substantial: therefore also the powers: ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate[5] assignat differentiam imaginis

On the contrary: 1. (St.) Augustine in the fifteenth (book of) On the Trinity[5] assigns

creatae ad Trinitatem illam, scilicet increatam, quia in illa Trinitate est habens id quod habetur, hic autem habens non est id quod habetur: ergo si anima habet tres potentias, ergo essentialiter non est illae.

the difference of the created image to that Trinity, that is the Uncreated One, because in that Trinity there is One having that which it had, but here there is not one having that which is had: therefore if the soul has three powers, therefore essentially it is not those.

2. Item, Dionysius[6] dicit, quod in quolibet creato differunt haec tria: *substantia*, *virtus* et *operatio*: ergo et in anima differunt substantia et potentiae.

2. Likewise, Dionysius (the Areopagite)[6] says, that in every created these three differ: *substance*, *virtue* and *operation*: therefore also in the soul do the substance and the powers differ.

3. Item, Boethius:[7] « In quolibet creato differunt *quo est* et *quod est*, sive *quid est* et *esse* »: ergo similiter, immo multo fortius, *quod potest* et *quo potest*.

3. Likewise (St. Severinus) Boethius (says):[7] « In every created there differ '*that whereby it is*' and '*that which it is*', or '*what it is*' and (its) '*to be*' [esse] »: therefore similarly, nay rather more strongly, '*that it can*' and '*that whereby it can*'.

4. Item, *rationibus* ostenditur sic: quae differrunt genere, differunt essentia, et unum de altero non praedicatur essentialiter;[8] sed potentiae et anima sunt huiusmodi, quia anima est in genere substantiae, sed potentiae eius sunt in secunda specie qualitatis, scilicet naturalis potentiae vel impotentiae: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, it is thus shown *by reasons*: what differs in genus, differs in essence, and one is not predicated of the other essentially;[8] but the powers and the soul are of this kind, because the soul is in the genus of substance, but its powers are in the second species of quality, that is of a natural power and/or impotence: ergo etc..

5. Item, illa quorum unum est extra alterum, differunt essentialiter et substantialiter; sed virtus egreditur substantiam,[9] quia operatur in obiectum, quod est extra; sed impossibile est, quod operetur ubi non est; si ergo virtus est ubi operatur, et operatur extra substantiam cuiuslibet: ergo egreditur extra substantiam: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, those of which one is outside the other, differ essentially and substantially; but virtue steps forth from substance,[9] because it works on the object, which is outside; but it is impossible, that it works where it is not; if therefore virtue is where it works, it works outside the substance of each [cuiuslibet]: therefore it steps forth from substance: ergo etc..

6. Item, ad hoc est alia ratio, quia si eadem per essentiam essent anima et potentiae, ergo[10] unum non multiplicaretur nisi secundum multiplicationem alterius; et sic, cum una tantum sit anima, haberet tantum unam potentiam; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

6. Likewise, for this there is another reason, because if by the same essence there were soul and powers, therefore[10] one would not be multiplied unless according to the multiplication of the other; and thus, since there is only one soul, it would have only one power; but this is false: ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Potentiae animae sunt substantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima; non sunt tamen cum ipsa

CONCLUSION

The powers of the soul are substantial and are in the same genus, by reduction, in which the soul is; however they are not

omnino idem per essentiam.

RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod potentia naturalis dicitur dupliciter.[11] *Uno modo*, prout dicit modum existendi naturalis potentiae in subiecto, secundum quem dicitur subiectum facile vel difficile ad aliquid agendum; et sic naturalis potentia dicit modum qualitatis et est generaliter in secunda specie qualitatis, ut patet, cum dicitur *cursor* et *pugillator*, quorum utrumque dicit facilitatem, quae consequitur[12] modum existendi potentiae gradiendi vel resistendi sive agendi in subiecto. *Alio modo* potentia naturalis dicitur potentia naturaliter egrediens a subiecto.[13] Et hoc potest esse dupliciter. Nam aliqua potentia egreditur a substantia *cum accidente*, ut / potentia calefaciendi.

entirely the same with it by essence.

I RESPOND: For the understanding of the aforesaid things it must be noted, that "natural power" is meant in a twofold manner.[11] *In one manner*, insofar as it means the manner of existing of a natural power in a subject, according to which it means a subject to do something easily and/or difficultly; and thus "natural power" means a manner of quality and is generally in the second species of quality, as is clear, when there is said *runner* [cursor] and *fighter* [pugillator], each of which means a faculty, which persues[12] a manner of existing of the power of stepping and/or of resisting or acting in the subject. *In another manner*, "natural power" is meant (as) a power naturally stepping forth from a subject.[13] And this can be in a twofold manner. For any power steps forth from a substance *with an accident*, as / the power of making-warm (does).

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[1] Ed. 1 *illius esset incapax*.
[2] Est simpliciter conversa huius propositionis: *Quod vere est* (i. e. substantia) *nulli accidit*, quam ponit Aristot., I. Phys. text. 27. (c. 3.).
[3] Interpolatam Vat. lectionem *quod uni est accidens, nulli substantia est, sed istae potentiae sunt ipsi animae substantiales, ergo non sunt ei accidentales et per consequens non sunt accidentalis*, castigavimus ex. mss. et ed. 1, qui et mox post *constat* omittunt a Vat. additum *autem*.
[4] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, *et* loco *sed*. Paulo ante cod. M *potentiis* praemittit *istis*.
[5] Textum vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. in initio.
[6] De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11. Cfr. supra p. I. huius d. dub. 3. — Fide codd. et ed. 1 paulo infra post *ergo* adiecimus *et*.
[7] In libro, Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint, sive de Hebdomadibus ait: Diversum est esse et id quod est. Et paulo post: Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est. In huius propositionis explicatione Gilbertus Porretan. ait: Aliud est *quod est*, aliud *quo est*. Vide etiam libr. de Trin. c. 2. — Plures codd. ut A E S V W X post *sive* legunt *quid est esse*, cod Y *quidquid erat esse*.
[8] Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (IX. c. 3.): Genere (differunt) quidem, quorum non est communis materia nec generatio ad invicem, quorumcumque alia figura categoriae (praedicationis). — Paulo infra post *sed potentiae* restituimus lectionem mss. et ed. 1 addendo *eius* et paulo post *vel impotentiae*. Paulo ante cod. X *sed potentiae animae et anima*. — De quatuor qualitatum speciebus vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali.
[9] Hoc est, extra substantiam; sic Tacitus pluries dicit *terminos egredi*. — Paulo post verbo *operetur* cod. X praemittit *ibi*. Mox cod. M loco *cuiuslibet* habet *cuius est*, cod. T vero *cuiusque*.

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[1] Edition 1 reads *it would be incapable of it* [illius esset incapax].
[2] It is simply the converse of this proposition: *What truly is* (i.e. a substance) *accedes to nothing*, which Aristotle posts in Physics, Bk. I, text 27, (ch. 3).
[3] The interpolated reading of the Vatican edition *what is an accident of one, is a substance of none, but those powers (of the soul) are substantial to the soul itself, therefore they are not accidental to it and consequently they are not accidents* [quod uni est accidens, nulli substantia est, sed istae potentiae sunt ipsi animae substantiales, ergo non sunt ei accidentales et per consequens non sunt accidentalis], we have corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1, which also at *it is established* [constat] omit the *but* [autem], added by the Vatican edition.
[4] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has *and* [et] in place of *but* [sed]. A little before this codex M prefaces *powers* [potentiis] with *those* [istis].
[5] See the passage above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3 at the beginning.
[6] On the Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 11. Cf. above in p. I of this distinction, dubium 3. — Trusting in the codices and edition 1, a little after this we have inserted *also* [et] after *therefore* [ergo].
[7] In the book, How substances to the extent that they are, are good or On the Seventh Days says: Diverse is the "to be" [esse] and "that which is". And a little after this: For every composite the "to be" [esse] is one part [aliud], "itself" is the other. In explanation of this proposition Gilbert of Porretain says: The one is *what it is*, the other *that whereby it is*. See also the book On the Trinity, ch. 2. — Very many codices as A E S V W X after *or* [sive] read *what its' to be' is* [quid est esse], codex Y has

[10] Fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ergo* et paulo infra ex codd. B D H N P Q V W X aa ee pro *unum* substituimus *una*. Cod. F *sicut anima est una tantum*, cum quo concordant codd. I O, eo excepto, quod pro *una* legunt *unum* ac dien post *tantum* addunt *sic anima*. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 65. m. 1. idem argumentum refert additque principium, in quo fundatur, scil.: Quaecumque enim uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem.
[11] Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 minus correcte *tripliciter*. Mox, postulantibus mss., substituimus *uno* et paulo infra *Alio modo* loco *Primo* et *Secundo modo*.
[12] Vat. *sequitur* et paulo post *et* loco *vel*, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
[13] Vat., minus stricte exhibet oppositionem cum primo divisionis membro ponendo *a substantia* loco *a subiecto*, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1; mox pro *Nam* habet *Uno modo*.

whatever its 'to be' was [quiquid erat esse].
[8] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. X, text 12, (Bk. IX, ch. 3): In genus (they differ) indeed, of which there is not a common matter nor a generation for one another, to whichever of these (belongs) the other figure of the category (of predication). — A little below this after *but . . . powers* [sed potentiae] we have restored the reading of the manuscripts and edition 1 by adding *its* [eius] and a little after this *and/or impotence* [vel impotentiae]. A little before this codex X reads *but the powers of the soul and the soul* [sed potentiae animae et anima]. — Concerning the four species of quality see Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. on Qualities.
[9] That is, outside of substance; thus Tacitus very often says *to step forth from the boundaries* [terminos egredi]. — A little after this to the word *it works* [operetur] codex X adds *there* [ibi]. Then codex M in place of *of each* [cuiuslibet] has *to which it belongs* [cuius est], but codex T has *of anything* [cuiusque].
[10] Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the *therefore* [ergo] and a little below this from codices B D H N P Q V W X aa ee we have substituted *one* [una] for *one (thing)* [unum]. Codex F has *just as the soul is only one* [sicut anima est una tantum], with which codices I and O agree, with this exception, that for *one* [una] they read *one (thing)* [unum] and then after *only one (thing)* [tantum] they add *as (is) the soul* [sic anima]. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 65, m. 1, refers to the same argument and adds the principles upon which it founded, that is: For whatever same are of one and of the same, are among themselves the same.
[11] The Vatican edition against nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3 has less correctly *in a threefold manner* [tripliciter]. Then, having questioned the manuscripts, we have substituted *In one* [Uno] and a little below *In another manner* [Alio modo] in place of *In the first* [Primo]and *In the second manner* [Secundo modo].
[12] The Vatican edition has *follows* and a little after this it has *and* [et] in place of *and/or* [vel], but the manuscripts and edition 1 oppose this.
[13] The Vatican edition, less strictly exhibits opposition with the first member of the division by putting *from a substance* [a substantia] in place of *from a subject* [a subiecto], in disagreement with the manuscripts and edition 1; then in place of *For* [Nam] it has *In one manner* [Uno modo].

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ut / potentia calefaciendi. Ignis enim per suam substantiam non calefacit sine caliditate; et haec potentia non est alterius generis quam sit qualitas, a qua egreditur; unde potentia[1] calefaciendi est in eodem genere cum caliditate. Alio modo dicitur naturalis potentia, quae naturaliter egreditur a[2] substantia et *immediate*, sicut

as / the power of making-warm (does). For first through its substance does not make (anything) warm without warmth; and this power does not belong to another genus than is the quality, from which it steps forth; whence the power[1] of making-warm is in the same genus with warmth. In another manner is meant "natural power", which

potentia generandi quantum ad inductionem ultimae formae; et haec quidem non est alterius generis quam substantia, sed reducitur ad genus substantiae tanquam substantialis differentia.

naturally steps forth from[2] a substance and (does so) *immediately*, as (is) the power of generating as much as regards the induction of the ultimate form; and this indeed does not belong to another genus than substance, but it is reduced to the genus of substance as a substantial difference.

Per hunc modum intelligendum est in potentiis animae. Nam *uno modo* contingit nominare potentias animae secundum primum modum, ut dicunt facilitatem, quae dicit modum potentiae existendi in subiecto, sicut ingeniositas et tarditas; et haec quidem sunt in secunda specie qualitatis. *Alio modo* contingit nominare potentias, prout dicunt ordinem substantiae ad actum, qui est *mediante* aliqua proprietate accidentali, ut potentiae syllogizandi, quae est in anima, cum habet habitum syllogizandi; et haec est in eodem genere, in quo est scientia syllogizandi, ut[3] in prima specie qualitatis. Contingit *iterum* nominare potentias animae, ut *immediate* egrediuntur a substantia, ut per[4] haec tria: memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto,[5] intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso quod est sibi praesens et sibi coniuncta, habet potentiam ad memorandum et intelligendum et diligendum se. Unde istae potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales[6] et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima. Attamen, quoniam egrediuntur ab anima — potentia enim se habet per modum egredientis — non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nec tamen adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem genere per reductionem.

In [per] this manner it must be understood in the powers of the soul. For *in one manner* one happens to name the powers of the soul according to the first manner, as they mean the facility, which means the manner of the existing of the power in the subject, as (are) ingeniousness and tardiness (of mind); and these indeed are in the second species of quality. *In another manner* one happens to name the powers, insofar as they mean the order of substance toward an act, which is *by means of* [mediante] some accidental property, as (is) the power of syllogizing, which is in the soul, when it has the power of syllogizing; and this is in the same genus, in which the science of syllogizing is, as[3] (being) in the first species of quality. *Again* it happens that one names the powers of the soul, as they *immediately* step forth from the substance, as (one does) by[4] these three: memory, intelligence and will. And this is clear, because since every accident is circumscribed,[5] having understood that the soul is a spiritual substance, by this very (accident) which is present to itself and has been conjoined with itself, it has power to remember and understand and love itself. Whence its powers are consubstantial[6] to the soul and are in the same genus through reduction, unto that which is the soul. But however, since they step forth from the soul — for power possesses [habet] itself by means of stepping forth — they are not entirely the same by essence, nor however to that extent do they differ, so as to belong to another genus, but they are in the same genus through reduction.

Et potest satis manifestum exemplum dari in *re* et in *similitudine eius*. Nam res non habet tantam identitatem cum sua similitudine, ut sint unum numero, nec tantam diversitatem, ut differant genere.[7]

And example, manifest enough, can be given in *thing* and in *its similitude*. For a thing does not have so much an identity with its similitude, so that they are one in number, nor so much diversity, that they

Similitudo enim Martini non adeo distat a Martino, ut penitus differat ab eo. Et ita similitudo rei in eodem genere est per reductionem cum eo, cuius est similitudo. Quia enim egreditur, ideo differt, sed non transit in aliud genus. Et loquor de similitudine secundum rationem similitudinis, non intentionis, id est, prout a subiecto[8] exit et non recedit, ut splendor a luce. Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, quod anima non est sua potentiae per essentiam.

differ in genus.[7] For the similitude of Martin does not stand so far from Martin, that it differs thoroughly from him. And thus the similitude of a thing is in the same genus by being leading back [reductionem] with that, of which it is the similitude. For because it steps forth, for that reason it differs, but it does not pass over into another genus. And I speak of similitude according to the reckoning of similitude, not of intention, that is, insofar that it exits from a subject[8] and does not recede (from it), as brilliance [splendor] (does) from a light. Therefore the reasons proving, that the soul is not its powers by essence, are to be conceded.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de Augustino et Bernardo, quod anima est suae potentiae; dicendum quod non est ibi praedicatio accidentis de subiecto, nec eiusdem per essentiam, sed substantialis vel essentialis.

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary concerning (Sts.) Augustine and Bernard, that the soul is its own powers; it must be said that There there is no predication of accident from a subject, nor of the same by essence, but of the substantial and/or essential.

Propter quod notandum, quod essentiale dicitur quatuor modis. *Primo modo* essentiale dicitur[9] quod dicit rei essentiam totam, sicut species singularis. *Secundo modo* dicitur essentiale quod est de essentiae et constitutione rei, ut materia et forma. *Tertio* modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest esse nec potest intelligi esse, ut sunt illa in quibus attenditur ratio vestigii, ut unitas, veritas, bonitas. *Quarto* modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in anima, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentiale; tamen non transit in aliud genus: ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae.[10]

On account of which it must be noted, that (something) is said (to be) "essential" in four manners. *In the first manner* the "essential" is said[9] (to be) that which means the whole essence of the thing, as the species of the singular. *In the second manner* the "essential" is said (to be) that which concerns the essence and the constitution of the thing, as matter and form. *In the third* manner the "essential" is said (to be that) without which the thing cannot be nor can it be understood to be, as are those in which the reckoning of the vestige is attained, as unity, truth, (and) goodness. *In the fourth* manner the "essential" is said (to be that) without which the thing cannot be thought to have been perfected, as are the powers in the soul, in which the image is attained; and this is in the least manner substantial or essential; however it does not pass over into another genus: for that reason the soul is said (to be) its powers.[10]

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et operandi; dicendum, quod verum est de principio remoto, sed de proximo est impos- / -sibile.

3. To that which is objected, that the same is the principle of being and operating; it must be said, that it is true of a remote principle, but of a proximate it is impos- / -sible.

[1] Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic male additim *quae est*. Paulo post cod. Y *Secundo modo* loco *Alio modo*, pro quo multi codd. ut A B D E I N S T etc. cum ed. 1 minus apte *Tertio modo*.
[2] Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, *de* loco *a* et immediate post imus bene omittit *et*. Paulo infra eadem auctoritate post *generis* posuimus *quam* pro *cum*, utpote grammatice melius ac praecedentibus magis conforme.
[3] Edd. 4, 5 *videlicet* loco *ut*. Mox cod. X *Ultra tertio modo contingit* pro *Contingit iterum*.
[4] Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. omittit *per*. — Immediate egredi potentias a substantia docet etiam S. Thom.; S. I. q. 77. a. 6. Cfr. insuper Dionys. Carth., hic q. 14.
[5] Hoc est, excluso sive praescindendo ab ipso. — In fine huius propositionis in Vat. omittitur *et diligendum*, in plurimus vero codd. *et intelligendum*, sed contra contextum et alios codd. ut I T aa cum ed. 1.
[6] Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *consubstantiales* pro *substantiales*.
[7] In plurimis mss. et Vat. manifeste falso habetur *numero* pro *genere*, quod tamen exhibet cod. Z. Mox plerique codd. cum ed. 1 mendose *Petrus differt* loco *penitus differat*. Iaon. Damasc., Orat. 3. de Imag. dicit: Nam aliud est imago, et aliud it quod imagine repraesentatur; ac necesse est, ut *non-nihil* inter utrumque discriminis animadvertatur; siquidem nec istd alia res esset, nec illud alia. — Paulo infra, postulantibus mss. substituimus *ita* pro *ideo*.
[8] Cod. A *substantia*. In fine responsionis cod. aa addit haec: *Vel potest dici, quod anima consideratur aut secundum essentiam ut essentiam, aut secundum essentiam ut substantiam, aut secundum essentiam ut subiectum. Si primo modo, sic consistit ex suis principiis, et sic non est idipsum anima quod suae potentiae, sed consequenter se habent ad eam, eo quod fundatur super vigorem existentiae ipsius secundum sua principia. Si secundo modo, tunc est anima et suae potentiae, quia anima subsistit in suis potentiis. Si tertio modo secundum essentiam ut in ratione subiecti, sic subiicitur ipsa anima suis virtutibus, et sic non est idem cum potentiis*. Glossema ad mentem Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1 ad. 2. et q. 65. m. 1.
[9] Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supllevimus *dictur*. Mox mss. sunt dubiae lectionis; legi enim potest *totam* et *tantum*; quamvis ed. 1 ponat *tantum*, retinemus tamen *totam* propter contextum. Et confirmatur a B. Alberto, S. I. tract. 3. q. 13. m. 5 dicente: Dicit enim Boethius, quod species est totum esse individuorum. (Boeth., III. Comment. in Porphyr. agens de species ait: Homo vero Socratis aut Ciceronis tota substantia est.) — Dein post *species* claritatis gratia Vat. addit *dicit totam essentiam*, licet desit in mss.
[10] Vat. prater fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit hic *quia non transit in aliud genus*.

[1] With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged here the badly added *which is* [quae est]. A little after this codex Y reads *In the second manner* [Secudno modo] in place of *In another manner* [Alio modo], for which many codices as A B D E I N S T etc. together with edition 1 have, less aptly, *In a third manner* [Tertio modo].
[2] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, has *from* [de] in place of *from* [a] and immediately after this omits, less well, *and* [et]. A little below this same authority, after *to another genus* [generis] we have put *than* [quam] in place of *with* [cum], as being better grammatically and more conformable to the preceding things.
[3] Editions 4 & 5 have *namely* [videlicet] in place of *as* [ut]. Then codex X has *Beyond the third manner one happens* [Ultra tertio modo contingit] in place of *Again one happens* [Contingit iterum].
[4] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and the six first editions omits *by* [per]. That the powers immediately step forth from the substance, St. Thomas also teaches, Summa., I, q. 77, a. 6. Cf. in addition (Bl.) Denis the Carthusian, here in q. 14.
[5] That is, having excluded or prescinded from it. — At the end of this proposition in the Vatican edition there is omitted *and love* [et diligendum], but in very many codices (there is omitted) *and to understand* [et intelligendum], but contrary to the context and to the other codices, as I T aa together with edition 1.
[6] On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have put *consubstantial* [consubstantiales] in place of *substantial* [substantiales].
[7] In very many manuscripts and the Vatican edition there is had in a manifestly false manner *in number* [numero] in place of *in genus* [genere], which however codex Z exhibits. Then the greater part of the codices together with edition 1 faultily read *Peter differs* [Petrus differt] in place of *it differs thoroughly* [penitus differat]. (St.) John Damascene, On Images, Oration 3, says: For one is the image, and the other that which is represented by the image; and it is necessary, that *not-nothing* of a diving line between each be perceived; if indeed this one would not be the other thing, nor that one the other. — A little below this, having reviewed the manuscripts, we have substituted *thus* [ita] for *for that reason* [ideo].
[8] Codex A *the substance*. At the end of the response codex aa adds these (words): *And/or it can be said, that the soul is considered either according to essence as an essence, or according to essence as a substance, or according to essence as a subject. If in the first manner, it thus consists from its own principles, and thus the soul is not the very thing [idipsum] which its powers (are), but consequently they are held for it, for this reason that they are founded upon the vigor of its existence according to its principles. If in the second manner, then the soul is also its powers, because the soul subsists in its powers. If in the third manner according to essence in the reckoning of a subject, thus the soul itself is subjected to its virtues, and thus it is not the same with its powers* [Vel potest dici, quod anima consideratur aut secundum essentiam ut essentiam,

aut secundum essentiam ut substantiam, aut secundum essentiam ut subiectum. Si primo modo, sic consistit ex suis principiis, et sic non est idipsum anima quod suae potentiae, sed consequenter se habent ad eam, eo quod fundatur super vigorem existentiae ipsius secundum sua principia. Si secundo modo, tunc est anima et suae potentiae, quia anima subsistit in suis potentiis. Si tertio modo secundum essentiam ut in ratione subiecti, sic subiicitur ipsa anima suis virtutibus, et sic non est idem cum potentiis]. A gloss according to the mind of Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 21, m. 1, at n. 2 and q. 65, m. 1.

[9] From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 & 6, we have supplied *is said (to be)* [dicitur]. Then the manuscripts have a doubtful reading, which can be read *the whole* [tantum] and *only the* [tantum]; although edition 1 has *only the* [tantum], we however retain *the whole* on account of the context. And this is confirmed by Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa., I, tract 3, q. 13, m. 5, saying: For (St. Severinus) Boethius says, that species is the whole being [totum esse] of individuals. (Commentary on Porphyry, Bk. III, dealing with species says: But man is the whole substance of Socrates or Cicero.) — Then after *species* [species] for the sake of clarity the Vatican edition adds *means the whole essence* [dicit totam essentiam], though this is lacking in the manuscripts.

[10] The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 repeats here *because it does not pass over into another genus* [quia non transit in aliud genus].

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est impos- / -sibile. Nam si idem omnino esset principium proximum, tunc idem esset in re esse et operari. *Similiter*, si idem esset principium proximum, cum res semper habeat esse, semper haberet operari. Quoniam igitur[1] *forma* dicit proximum et immediatum principium essendi, *potentia* vero proximum et immediatum principium operandi, patet quod impossibile est esse omnino idem.

it is impos- / -sible. For if the same were entirely the proximate principle, then it would be the same in the thing 'to be' and 'to work'. *Similarly*, if the same were the proximate principle, since the thing always has a being [esse], it would always have a working [operari]. Therefore since[1] *form* means the proximate and immediate principle of being, but *power* the proximate and immediate principle of working, it is clear that it is impossible to be entirely the same.

4. Ad aliud quod obiicitur de potentia materiae, dicendum, quod materia non est sua potentia per essentiam, quoniam non est ipsa ordinatio ad formam; est tamen ipsa potentia materiae essentialis ipsi materiae, sicut potentia activa ipsi substantiae. Et minus quidem elongatur potentia materiae a materia quam potentia activa a substantia; quoniam potentia

4. To that which is objected concerning the power of matter, it must be said, that matter is not its own power by essence, since it is not itself an ordination to form; however there is a power itself of matter essential to matter itself, just as an active power (is) to the substance itself. And indeed the power of matter is less distanced [elongatur] from matter than an active

materiae est potentia passiva, quae dicit ordinem ad aliud cum privatione, sed potentia activa dicit ordinem cum positione; et ideo minus addit potentiae materiae supra materiam, quam potentia activa supra[2] substantiam. Et hinc est, quod non ita distinguuntur diversae potentiae in eadem materia, sicut in eadem subtantia.

power (is) from substance; since the power of matter is a passive power, which means an 'order to something with a privation', but an active power means an 'order with position'; and for that reason it adds less to the power of matter upon matter, than an active power upon[2] substance. And hence it is, that the diverse powers are not so distinguished in the same matter, as (they are) in the same substance.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de forma accidentali, dicendum, quod forma accidentalis non est sua potentia. Nam potentia eius est, in quantum influit in alterum; attamen potentia illa non tantum addit quantum potentia formae substantialis, quoniam potentia formae accidentalis dicit ordinationem ad actum, sed non sufficientem per se, sed per virtutem substantiae. Sicut enim accidens non *est* per se, ita non habet virtutem *operandi* per se, sed per virtutem substantiae; et ita hoc patet.

5. To that which is objected concerning the accidental form, it must be said, that an accidental form is not its own power. For the power belongs to it, inasmuch as it inflows into another; but however that power does not add as much as the power of the substantial form (does), since the power of the substantial form means an ordination to act, but not 'one sufficient through itself', but (rather) '(sufficient) by virtue of the substance'. For just as the accident *is* not through itself, so that it does not have the virtue of *operating* through itself, but by the virtue of the substance; and thus this (argument) it is clear.

6. Ad illud quod obiictur ultimo, dicendum est,[3] quod potentiae animae non sunt accidentales. Tamen argumentum non valet, quia fortassis *rationale*, *sensibile*, *vegetabile* non accipiuntur a potentiis, sed a diversis naturis repertis in anima.

6. To that which is objected lastly, it must be said,[3] that the powers of the soul are not accidental. However the argument is not valid, because perhaps the *rational*, *sensible*, (and) *vegetable* are not accepted as powers, but as diverse natures discovered in the soul.

Illud autem argumentum, quod factum est ad oppositum, quod differunt, quia sunt in diversis generibus, solvendum est per interemptionem,[4] quia non sunt in diversis generibus, sed in eodem per reductionem.

But that argument, that has been made to the opposite, that they do differ, because they are in diverse genera, must be explained through interemption,[4] because they are not in diverse genera, but (they are) in the same (genus) by reduction.

SCHOLION.

I. Circa principalem quaestionem illis temporibus tres sententiae defendebantur, quas S. Bonav. (II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.) accurate explicat. *Prima* sententia ibi posita non admittit inter essentiam animae et potentias nisi distinctionem *rationis*. Ita Gulielmus Paris., Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.), Henr. Gand. (Quodl. IV. q. 7.), insuper omnes Nominales. — *Secunda* docet distinctionem *realem*, et quidem talem, ut

SCHOLIUM

I. About the principle question, in those times three sentences used to be defended, which St. Bonaventure (Sent., Bk. II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1) accurately explains. *The first* sentence posited there does not admit between the essence of the soul and the powers (anything) except a distinction *of reason*. Thus William of Paris, Richard of Middletown (here in a. 2, q. 1), Henry of Ghent (Quodlibetals, Bk. IV, q. 7), besides all

potentiae *nec in genere* cum substantia conveniant, cum ad genus accidentium trahantur. Ita S. Thom. (hic q. 4. a. 2; S. I. q. 54. a. 3. et q. 77. a. 1. et 3; de Spirit. Creaturis a. 11; de Anima q. 12.); B. Albert. (hic a. 34.); Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 2). — *Tertia* sententia praecedenti valde appropinquat, quam docet Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 65. m. 1. et q. 21. m. 1.). Huic etiam S. Bonav. magis favet; tamen dicit: « Quaelibet autem dictarum positionem suos habet defensores, nec est facile rationibus cogentibus earum aliquam improbare ». Haec igitur ultima sententia admittit quidem inter animae substantiam et potentias eius connaturales et consubstantiales distinctionem quandam *realem*, quae tamen non tahat potentias ad diversum genus praedicamenti, nempe accidentis (tamen *habitus acquisiti*, quibus alia extra animam cognoscuntur et amantur, certe cadunt sub genere accidentium). Immo si potentiae non essent animae consubstantiales, nunquam anima sciret et amaret aliquid ad extra, quia, ut dicit S. Augustinus, nullum accidens excedit subiectum, scil. sua virtute. Nam accidens, sicut non *est* nisi virtute substantiae, sic nec *operari* potest nisi virtute substantiae, et nisi aliquid substantiale ei subsertnatur. Unde nec habitus acquisiti agere possunt nisi virtute habituum vel potentiarum substantialium, cfr. ad 5. et art. 2. a. 2. ad 4. et S. Thomas, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 4. — Videtur autem, quod S. Bonav. et Alex. conceptum *accidentis* sumant pro accidente logico, S. Thom. pro accidente metaphysico, ita ut in re conveniant. En verba Alexandri (S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1.): « Dicendum, quod anima est quodammodo sua potentia, ut fiat distinctio inter potentias substantiales sive vires ex una parte et accidentia ex alia, quantum ad hoc, quod potentiae et vires substantialiter inhaerent et unum sunt cum anima quantum ad substantiam, non dico quantum ad essentiam; potentiis enim substantialibus subsistit anima. Accidentia vero, ut prudentia, fortitudo et huiusmodi, non adhaerent substantialiter, quia haec accidentaliter adsunt. Unde potentiae et vires substantiales dicuntur idem quod anima ratione indivisionis et adhaerentiae substantialis, accidentia vero non, quia substantialiter non adhaerent ». Fere idem

the Nominalists. — *The second* teaches a *real* distinction, and indeed such, that the powers agree *neither in genus* with the substance, since they are drawn to the genus of accidents. Thus St. Thomas (here in q. 4, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 54, a. 3 and q. 77 a. 1 and 3; de Spiritu Creaturis, a. 11; On the Soul, q. 12); Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) (here in a. 34); (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 5, a. 2). — *The third* sentence, which Alexander of Hales teaches (Summa., p. II, q. 65, m. 1, and q. 21, m . 1), nearly approaches the preceding one. St. Bonaventure also favors this one more; however he says: « But each of the said positions has its own defenders, nor it is easy to disprove any of them with cogent reasons ». Therefore this last sentence indeed admits among the substance of the soul and its connatural and consubstantial powers a certain [quandam] *real* distinction, which however does not draw the powers to a diverse genus of predicament, namely of accident (however the *acquired habits*, by which other (things) outside the soul are cognized and loved, certainly fall under the genus of accidents). Nay if the powers were not consubstantial with the soul, the soul would never know and love anything outside itself, because, as St. Augustine says, no accident exceeds a subject, that is its own virtue. F or an accident, just as *it is* not except by virtue of its substance, so neither can it *work* except by virtue of the substance, and unless something substantial is spread beneath it. Whence neither can the acquired habits act except by virtue of the habits and/or substantial powers, cf. here at n. 5 and article 2, q. 2. at n. 4 and St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 77, a. 1 at n. 4. — But it seems, that St. Bonaventure and Alexander (of Hales) take the concept of the *accident* as a logical accident, (and) St. Thomas as a metaphysical accident, so that in re they do agree. Behold the words of Alexander (of Hales) (Summa., p. II, q. 21, m. 1): « It must be said, that the soul is in a certain manner its own power, to make a distinction among the substantial powers or strengths on one part and the accidents on the other, as much as regards this, that the powers and strengths substantially inhere and are one with the soul as much as regards the

est quod S. Thom. (S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 5.) docet. Hic enim distinguit duplicem sensum vocabuli *accidentis*, et in secundo sensu, sive « secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium », concedit, quod « potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales ».

substance, I do not say as much as regards the essence; for by the substantial powers does the soul subsist. But the accidents, as prudence, fortitude and the like, do not adhere substantially, because they are there accidentally. Whence the powers and substantial strengths are said (to be) the same that the soul (is) by reason of indivision and substantial adherence ». Nearly the same is what St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 77, a. 1, at n. 5) teaches. For he distinguishes a twofold sense of the word *accident*, and in the second sense, or « according to which it is posited as one of the five universals », he concedes, that « something is the medium between the substance and the accident », and that « the powers of the soul cant be said to be the media between the substance and the accident, as if natural properties of the soul ».

Quartam sententiam adiunxit Scot. (II. Sent. d. 16. q. unica § Dico igitur), qui hic applicat suam distinctionem formalem; in re autem a S. Bonav. vix discedit, ut vult Brulifer in Comment. ad hunc locum.

The fourth sentence is added by (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, q. sole, § "Therefore I say", who here applies his formal distinction; but in re St. Bonaventure scarcely departs, as Brulifer would have it in his Commentary on this point.

De quaestione hac cfr. praeter iam citatos B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. subp. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 3. pinc. q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic p. II. q. 2 et seqq. — Dionyus. Carth., hic q. 13. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 24. et 25.

On this question cf. besides those cited above, Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 3. q. 15, m. 2, q. 2, subp. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in n. 3 at the beginning of q. 1, a. 2. — Durandus, here in p. II, q. 2 and ff.. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 13. — (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. II, d. 24 and 25.

II. Ut facilius intelligantur verba Doctoris in fine conclusionis posita: « Loquor de similitudine secundum rationem similitudinis, non intentionis », haec notamus. Praeter similitudinem *accidentalem*, quae est v. g. in figura exteriori, et *essentialem*,

II. So that there may be more easily understood the Doctor's words placed at the end of the conclusion: « I speak of the similitude according to the reckoning of similitude, not of intention », we note these things. Besides the *accidental* similitude, which is for example in an exterior figure, and the *essential*,

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[1] Vat. contra polurmos codd. et ed. 1 *Quia ergo*.
[2] Cod. O addit *formam aut*.
[3] Ex codd. et ed. 1 addidimus *est*. Plures codd. ut A T etc. paulo ante habent *quaeritur* loco *obiicitur*.
[4] Petrus Hispan., Summula, tract. de Syll. soph. seu de Fallaciis, in fine de fall. aequivocationis ait: Recta solutio est manifestatio syllogismi falsi et propter quid est falsus. Et contingit dupliciter, scil. vel *distinguendo* vel aliam praemissarum *interimendo*; et hoc secundo modo respondendum est ad omnes preccants in mattera (i. e. propositiones falsa). Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 18.) duplicem hanc

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[1] The Vatican edition contrary to very many codices and edition 1 has *Therefore because* [Quia ergo].
[2] Codex O adds *form or* [formam aut].
[3] From the codices and edition 1 we have added *must* [est]. Very many codices as A T etc. a little before this have *is asked* [quaeritur] in place of *is objected* [obiicitur].
[4] Peter of Spain, Summula., tract "On sophistic Syllogisms or on Fallacies", at the end of the (discussion on) the fallacy of equivocation says: The right solution is a manifestation of the false syllogism and that on account of which it is false. And this

solutionis speciem proponendo usus est verbis □□□□□□□□ et □□□□□□□□, quae Boethius lingua latina reddidit per verba *dintinguere* et *interimere* (i. e. negando auferre.). — Paulo supra aliqui codd. ut A G H K T etc. cum ed. *differant* pro *differunt*.

happens in a two fold manner, that is *by distinguishing* and/or by *interemption* [interimendo]; and in this second manner one must respond to everything sinning in the matter (i. e. to the false propositions). Aristotle, Lists of Sophistic Errors., Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 18), when proposing this twofold species of solution used the words □□□□□□□□ and □□□□□□□□, which Boethius rendered in the Latin tongue by the words distinguere and interimere (i.e. to take away by negating). — A little above this some codices as A G H K T etc. together with edition 1 have the subjunctive for *they differ* [differant].

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quae est in convenientia in natura et specie, aliam similitudinem duplicem distinguit S. Doctor, scil. similitudinem *secundum rationem*, qua aliqua sunt similia in ratione quadam essentiali, ut splendor respectu lucis, et similitudinem *secundum intentionis*, quae est inter aliqua, quorum unum est factum ad imitationem alterius. Ex hoc patet, quod *splendor*, qui est similitudo lucis, licet exeat a luce, tamen non recedit ab ea, manens in eodem genere lucis.

which is in fittingness in nature and species, the Seraphic Doctor distinguishes another twofold similitude, that is the similitude *according to reckoning*, by which some are similar in a certain essential reckoning, as brilliance (is) in respect to light, and the similitude *according to intention*, which is among some, one of which has been made for the imitation of the other. From this it is clear, that *brilliance*, which is a similitude of light, though it goes forth from light, does not however recede from it, remaining in the same genus of light.

III. In solut. ad 1. et 2. distinguit S. Doctor *triplicem praedicationem*. Praedicatio per *essentiam* tunc fit, quando pradicatum est de intrinseca ratione subiecti. Haec est iterum duplex, nempe secundum duplicem sensum vocabuli *essentialis*, a S. Doctore hic distinctum. Etenim tum essentia *metaphysica*, quam moderni vocant (scil. genus et differentia), tum partes constitutivae *physicae* (scil. forma et materia) sunt de essentia rei et de subiecto essentialiter praedicantur. Huic opponitur praedicatio *accidentalis*, quando praedicatum subiecto tantum accidentaliter convenit, ut, homo est sapiens. — Circa *tertiam* praedicationem, quae hic distinguitur, notandum est, quod aliud est «esse de essentia alicuius rei », aliud « esse idem in essentia cum aliquo ». « *Proprium* enim alicuius rei non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens » (S. Thomas, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 5.). Etiam potentiae animae non sunt de essentiae animae, nec praedicantur de ea in primo dicendi modo per se, sicut genus

III. In the solution to nn. 1 and 2 the Seraphic Doctor distinguishes *a threefold predication*. A predication by *essence* [per essentiam] is made, when the predicate concerns the intrinsic reckoning of the subject. Again this is twofold, namely according to a twofold sense of the word "*essential*", here distinguished by the Seraphic Doctor. For even both the *metaphysical* essence, as the moderns call it (that is the genus and difference), and the constitutive *physical* parts (that is the form and matter) concern the essence of the thing and are predicated essentially of the subject. To this is opposed *accidental* predication, when the predicate only accidentally convenes with the subject, as, the man is wise. — About the *third* predication, which is here distinguished, it must be noted, that one is « to be from the essence of any thing », another « to be the same in essence with something ». « For *what belongs* [proprium] to any thing does not concern the essence of the thing, but is caused from the essential principles of the species, whence there is a medium between

pradicatur de specie. Nihilominus participant potentiae eandem naturam cum essentia animae, sive sunt « idem in essentia cum ipsa ». De quo cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 2. et B. Albert., hic q. 34.

essence and accident » (St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 77, a. 1, at n. 5). Even the powers of the soul do not concern the essence of the soul, nor are they predicated of it in the first manner of meaning per se, as genus is predicated of species. Nevertheless the powers do participate in the same nature with the essence of the soul, or are « the same in essence with it ». Concerning which cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 18, m. 2 and Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in q. 34.

Notatu digna est doctrina Seraphici in solut. ad 4. de potentia materiae. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 65. m. 1. Cfr. Scot., libr. I. Physicor. a. 20; de Rerum princip. q. 8. a. 2; I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 12. q. 10. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2 ad 4. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 6. ad 8.

It is worth noting the doctrine of the Seraphic (Doctor) in the solution to n. 4 on the power of matter. Alexander of Hales teaches the same thing, Summa., p. II, q. 65, m. 1. Cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Physics, Bk. I, a. 20; On the First Principle of Things, q. 8, a. 2; Sent., Bk. I, d. 12, q. 1. — Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. II, d. 12, q. 10. — St. Thomas, here in q. 4, q. 2, at n. 4. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 26, a. 6, at n. 8.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

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St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. II.

ARTICULUS II.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART II

ARTICLE II

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 88-90.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 88-90.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

ARTICULUS II.

De secunda assignatione imaginis.

Consequenter est quaestio de *secunda* assignationis imaginis per mentem, notitiam et amorem. Et[1] circa hanc quaeruntur tria.

Primum est de istis absolute, utrum videlicet imago attendatur in istis ut in potentiis, aut in habitibus, aut in potentiis simul et habitibus, aut in substantia et habitibus.

Secundum est de istis in comparatione ad invicem.

Tertium, utrum haec trinitas imaginis ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas.

ARTICLE II

On the second impression of the image.

Consequently there is the question concerning the *second* impression of the image through mind, knowledge [notitia] and love [amorem]. And[1] about this there are asked three (things).

The *first* concerns these absolutely, namely, whether the image is attained in these as in the powers, or in the habits, or in the powers and habits simultaneously, or in the substance and in the habits.

The *second* concerns these in comparison to one another.

The *third*, whether this trinity of image leads necessarily unto cognition of the Trinity as much as regards the Persons.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum imago attendatur in mente, notitia et amore ut in potentiis, aut ut in habitibus, aut in utrisque simul, aut secundum substantiam et habitus.

C**IRCA PRIMUM** sic proceditur.

1. Ostenditur *primo*, quod non in his ut in *potentiis* attendatur imago, quia praedicta assignatio[2] fuit in potentiis: ergo si haec etiam esset in potentiis, non esset nisi inculcatio verborum.

Praeterea, notitia et amor non dicunt potentiam, sed habitus, licet mens possit dicere potentiam: ergo praedicta tria non possunt poni sub ratione potentiarum.

2. Item ostenditur, quod non dicunt *habitus*, quia Augustinus[3] dicit in imaginis assignatione et approbatione: « Mens novit se, diligit se »; sed nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare: ergo etc.

QUESTION 1

Whether the image is attained in mind, knowledge and love as in the powers, or as in the habits, or in both simultaneously, or according to substance and habits

A**BOUT THE FIRST** it is thus proceeded.

1. *First* it is shown, that the image is not attained in these as in the *powers*, because the aforesaid assignation[2] was in the powers: therefore if this would also be in the powers, it would be naught but a pressing of words [inculcatio verborum].

Besides, "knowledge" and "love" do not mean a "power", but a "habit", though "mind" can mean a "power": therefore the aforesaid three cannot be posited under a reckoning of powers.

2. Likewise it is shown, that they do not mean *habits*, because (St.) Augustine[3] says on the assignation and approbation of the image: « The mind knows [novit] itself, loves [diligit] itself »; but to no habit does it belong to know or love [amare] itself: ergo etc..

Item, si mens stat pro habitu, quaero, pro quo habitu? Si pro habitu memoriae, de quo magis videtur, quia non est alium dare; sed actus huius habitus est meminisse, non alius; sed Augustinus[4] assignat menti hos actus, scilicet nosse et amare: ergo etc..

Likewise, if "mind" stands for "habit", I ask, for which habit? If for the habit of memory, concerning which it rather seems, that there is not another to give (it to); but the act of this habit is to remember, (there is) no other; but (St.) Augustine[4] assigns to the mind those acts, that is to know and to love: ergo etc..

3. Item ostenditur, quod non[5] in *potentiis et habitibus*. Cum enim potentiae sint tres, et habitus tres, tunc non esset ternarius, sed senarius.

3. Likewise it is shown, that (it is) not[5] in the *powers and the habits*. For since the powers are three, and the habits three, then there would not be a group of three [ternarius], but of six [senarius].

4. Item quaero, pro qua potentia stat ibi mens? aut enim stat pro omnibus, aut pro duabus, aut pro una. Si pro omnibus, tunc non est ibi trinitas; si pro duabus, tunc est ibi quaternitas, cum duo sint habitus; si pro una, non potest habere istos duos actus,[6] nosse et amare: ergo non sumitur trinitas secundum habitus et potentias simul.

4. Likewise I ask, which power does "mind" stand for there? for either it stands for all (of them), or for two, or for one. If for all, then there is no trinity there; if for two, then there is a quaternity there, since there are two habits; if for one, it can not have those two acts (of the soul),[6] to know and to love: therefore trinity is taken according to the habits and the powers simultaneously.

1. Item ostenditur, quod non secundum animae *substantiam* et *habitus*.[7] Cum enim habitus cognoscendi et amandi consequantur ipsam substantiam tempore, et substantia etiam possit esse sine his, ratio autem imaginis sit ipsi animae perpetua et inseparabilis et concreata: ergo non est in habitibus et substantia simul.

1. Likewise it is shown, that (it is) not according to the *substance* and *habits* of the soul.[7] For since the habits of cognizing and loving follow immediately [consequantur] the substance itself in time, and (since) the substance can be without these, but the reckoning of the image is perpetual and inseparable and co-created [concreata] with the soul itself: therefore it is not in the habits and in the substance (of the soul) simultaneously.

2. Item, si substantia connumeratur habitibus, cum[8] habitus sint tres, et substantia una: ergo erit / ibi quaternitas.

2. Likewise, if substance is numbered with the habits, since[8] the habits are three, and the substance one: therefore there will be / a quaternity there.

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[1] Vat. omittit *Et*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra post *Tertium* ed. 1 addit *est*.
[2] Scilicet memoria, intellectus et voluntas, de qua supra in a. 1. — Mox substituimus ex mss. *haec* loco *hic*.
[3] Textum Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa medium. — Vat. paulo ante loco *dicunt habitus* ponit *ut in habitibus*, et paulo post omittit *et approbatione*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. — Mox ex cod. X cum ed. 1 post *est* supplevimus, rei veritate exigente, *se*.
[4] Verba Augustini inveniuntur supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa medium. — Paulo post *meminisse* auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 expunximus *et*, quod Vat. addit.
[5] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et sex primis edd., addit *ut*.
[6] Codd. X Y addunt *scilicet*.
[7] Ita codd. et sex primae edd. contra Vat., quae habet *Contra. Ostenditur, quod non ut in substantia*

[1] The Vatican edition omits *And* [Et], but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1. A little below this after *The third* [Tertium] edition 1 adds *is* [est].
[2] That is the memory, the intellect and the will, concerning which (see) above in a. 1. — Then we have substituted from the manuscripts *this (assignation)* [haec] in place of *here (in the powers)* [hic].
[3] See the text of (St.) Augustine above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3, about the middle. — The Vatican edition a little before this puts *as in the habits* [aut in habitibus] in place of *do . . mean habits* [dicunt habitus], and a little after this it omits *and approbation*, but contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1. — Then from codex X together with edition 1 we have supplied after *does it belong* [est], for the sake of exactness, *itself* [se].
[4] The words of (St.) Augustine are found above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3 about the middle.

et habitibus simul et paulo post *sequantur* pro *consequantur*.
[8] Substituimus opse mss. et ed. 1 hic *cum* loco *et* ac paulo infra *intelligentiae* pro *intellectivae*.

— A little above this after *to remember* [meminisse], on the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6, we have expunged *and* [et], which the Vatican edition adds.
[5] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and the six first editions, adds *as* [ut].
[6] Codices X and Y add *that is* [scilicet].
[7] Thus the codices and the six first editions against the Vatican edition, which has *On the Contrary. It is shown, that (it is) not in the substance and habits simultaneously* [Contra. Ostenditur, quod non ut in substantia et habitibus simul] and a little after this it has *follow* in place of *follow immediately* [consequantur].
[8] We have substituted with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 at this point *since* [cum] in place of *and* [et] and a little below this (on p. 89) *of intelligence* [intelligentiae] in place of *of the intellective (part)* [intellectivae].

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ibi quaternitas. *Si tu dicas*, quod non differt notitia, secundum quod est habitus intelligentiae et memoriae; *contra*: habitus sunt dispositiones potentiarum; cum ergo sint tres potentiae, erunt tres habitus.

a quaternity there. *If you say*, that knowledge [notitia] does not differ, according to which it is a habit of the intelligence and the memory; *on the contrary*: the habits are dispositions of the powers; therefore since there are three powers, there will be three habits.

3. Item, Magister dicit in littera,[1] quod mens accipitur non pro animae substantia, sed pro eo quod est in ea eminentius.

3. Likewise, Master (Peter) says in (his) text,[1] that "mind" is accepted not for the substance of the soul, but for that which is in it more eminently.

CONCLUSIO.

In hac secunda assignatione imaginis, quae est mens, notitia, amor, trinitas attenditur quantum ad substantiam animae et quantum ad duos habitus notitiae et amoris.

CONCLUSION

In this second impression of the image, which is mind, knowledge, (and) love, a trinity is attained as much as regards the substance of the soul and as much as regards the two habits of knowledge and love.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod differt secundum quosdam assignatio haec a praecedenti, quia prior fuit in potentiis, haec est in habitibus. Et respondent obiectionibus per distinctionem mentis. Mens enim secundum quadruplicem modum accipiendi diversificatur. Dicitur enim *uno* modo a *mene*, quod est luna sive defectus: et sic dicitur de tota animae substantia propter transmutationes, quas habet.[2] *Secundo* modo dicitur a *metiendo*; et sic stat pro iudicativa vi, et sic accipit eam Damascenus,[3] ponens ipsam in potentiis

I respond: It must be said, that this impression does differ according to certain (aspects) from the preceding, because the prior was in the powers, this is in the habits. And (these) correspond to the objections through a distinction of "mind". For "mind" [mens] is diversified according to a fourfold manner of being accepted. For it is said in *one* manner as a <u>menis</u>, which is a <u>luna</u> or defect; and thus it is said of the whole substance of the soul on account of the transmutations, which it has.[2] In a *second* manner it is said as *one measuring*

cognitivis. *Tertio* modo dicitur ab *eminendo*; et sic stat pro superiori parte rationis, et sic accipit eam Augustinus frequenter.[4] *Quarto* modo dicitur a *meminisse*; et sic stat pro memoria et quantum ad actum et quantum ad habitum.[5] Dicunt ergo, quod in assignatione huius trinitatis *mens* stat pro habitu memoriae; sed in adaptatione, cum dicit Augustinus:[6] « Mens novit se et diligit », stat pro potentia memorandi.

[metiendo]; and thus it stands for the judicative strength, and thus does (St. John) Damascene accept it,[3] placing it in the cognitive powers. In a *third* manner it is said as *one outstanding* [eminendo]; and thus it stands for the superior part of the reason, and thus does (St.) Augustine frequently accept it.[4] In a *fourth* manner it is said as *to remember* [meminisse]; and thus it stands for the memory both as much as it regards an act and as much as it regards a habit.[5] Therefore they say, that in the assignation of this trinity the *mind* stands for the habit of memory; but by adaptation [in adaptatione], when (St.) Augustine says:[6] « The mind knows itself and loves », it stands for the power of calling to mind [memorandi].

Sed istud non videtur convenienter dictum, quia adaptatio debet respondere assignationi. Et praeterea, cum actus proprius mentis, ut stat pro memoria, sit meminisse, ille[7] deberet tangi; sed Augustinus in hac assignatione nunquam facit mentionem nisi de duobus actibus, scilicet nosse et amare, qui non sunt memoriae, sed aliarum potentiarum.

But that does not seem to be fittingly said, because adaptation ought to correspond to impression. And moreover, since the proper act of the mind, as it stands for memory, is to remember, that[7] ought to be touched upon; but (St.) Augustine in this assignation never makes mention except of two acts, that is to know and to love, which do not belong to the memory, but to the other powers.

Respondendum igitur, quod trinitas illa non est in *potentiis*; quia *amor* et *notitia* non dicunt potentias;[8] nec in *habitibus*, quia mens non potest stare pro habitu, cum ipsa accipiatur ut agens; nec potest esse in *potentiis et habitibus*, quia mens non potest stare pro una potentia, cum assignentur ei actus duarum potentiarum; nec potest similiter[9] stare pro *pluribus potentiis*, quia non esset trinitas. Restat ergo, quod necesse est ponere, quod trinitas ista attendatur quantum ad *substantiam* animae, ratione mentis se noscentis et amantis; et sic est trinitas, cum substantia sit una, et habitus sint duo.

Therefore it must be responded, that that trinity is not in the *powers*; because *love* and *knowledge* [amor et notitia] do not mean “powers”;[8] nor in the *habits*, because “mind” cannot stand for a “habit”, when it is accepted as an agent; nor can it be in *powers and habits*, because “mind” cannot stand for one power, since to it are assigned the acts of two powers; nor can it similarly[9] stand for *more powers*, because it would not be a trinity. Therefore it remains [restat], that it is necessary to posit, that that trinity is attained as much as regards the *substance* of the soul, by reason of the mind knowing and loving itself; and thus there is a trinity, since the substance is one, and the habits are two.

Differt ergo haec assignatio a praecedenti: quia praecedens fuit per uniformitatem in potentiis per comparationem ad habitus et[10] actus, sed haec est in substantia et habitibus. Differt *iterum* in hoc, quia praecedens fuit per conversionem animae ad Deum, haec est per conversionem animae supra se; et pluribus modis non attenditur imago in homine, ut supra dictum

Therefore this impression differs from the preceding: because the preceding was through a uniformity in the powers through a comparison to habits and[10] acts, but this one is in substance and habits. It differs *again* in this, that the preceding was through the conversion of the soul towards God, and this one is through conversion of the soul upon itself; and the image is not

fuit.[11] Differt *etiam*, quia praecedens assignatio imaginis magis est propria et conveniens quam haec. Nam proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis, quae consistit in gratia et[12] virtutibus theologicis. Unde Augustinus hanc assignationem primo ponit investigando, ut per hanc deveniat ad illam, in qua finit speculationem suam.[13] Unde haec assignatio non est propria, sicut alia; unde Magister eam secundo ponit tanquam non principalem.

attained in man in more manners, as had been said above.[11] It differs *also*, because the preceding impression of the image is more proper and fitting than this one. For properly speaking, the image consists in a unity of essence and a trinity of powers, according to which (powers) the soul has been born to be sealed by the Most High Trinity with the image of similitude, which consists in grace and[12] the theological virtues. Whence (St.) Augustine first posits this assignation by investigating, so that through this (second assignation) he may arrive at That, in which finishes his speculation.[13] Whence this (latter) impression is not proper, as the other; whence Master (Peter) places it second as (it is) not the principle one.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod habitus non sunt coaevi etc.; dicendum, quod *triplex* est habitus. Quendam enim habitum habet animae potentia ab *acquisitione*, quendam ab innata *dispositione*, tertium habet a *sui ipsius origine*. Hoc autem patet, quia habitus est quo potentia facilis est in actum; potentia autem his tribus modis est facilis, verbi gratia, *affectus* noster habet facilitatem ad diligendum bonum alienum per acquisitam dispositio- / -nem ut per virtutem;

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the habits are not coeval etc.; it must be said, that habit is *threefold*. For the power of the soul has a certain habit from acquisition, a certain one from an innate *disposition*, a third it has from *its very own origin*. But this is clear, because the habit is (that) whereby a power is facile unto act; but in these three manners there is a facile habit, e. g., our *affection* [affectus] has a facility to love [diligendum] another good through an acquired disposition / as through a virtue; . . .

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[1] Cap. 3 circa medium, quem tamen textum plurimi mss. cum sex primis edd. hic mutarunt, pro *anima* ponendo *animae substantia tota*; codd. vero T X *animae substantia*, quos sequimur, quia eorum lectio correspondet sensui obiicientium. Cfr. Scholion.
[2] De hac mentis acceptione vide libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 11.
[3] Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22: « Vires in cognitione positae sunt mens, cogitatio, opinio, sensus ». Et singula perpendens de *mente* dicit quod verum est *iudicat* (considerat, discernit; sive, ut refert Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 69 in princ.: mens a *metiendo* dicitur.).
[4] Cfr. Ennaratio in Psalm. 3. n. 3; XV. de Trin. c. 7. n. 11. Vide etiam libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 11. et 34. Consentit Isidor., XI. Etymolog. c. 1.
[5] Cfr. Isidor. loc. cit. et libr. de Spiritu et anima, ch. 34. — De his quatuor etymologiis, quae ex more illius aetatis iudicari debent, vide Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 1. a. 2. circa finem (in aliis edd. q. 55).
[6] Codd. cunt inter se divisi; plures siquidem ut G O T bb habent *Augustinus*, quos sequimur, alii vero ut A C L S Z etc. *ecce*; omnes tamen cotra Vat. *dicit* loco *dicitur*. Ed. 1 *dicit Magister et Augustinus: ecce mens*.
[7] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *ibi* pro *ille*.

[1] Chapter 3, about the middle, which text, however, very many manuscripts together with the six first editions change here, by putting *soul* [animae] in place of *whole substance of the soul* [animae substantia tota]; but codices T and X *substance of the soul* [animae substantiae], which we follow, because their reading corresponds to the sense of the objections. Cf. Scholium.
[2] On this acceptation of "mind" see the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 11.
[3] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 22: « The strengths [vires] placed in cognition are mind, thinking [cogitatio], opinion, (and) sense ». And pondering singulars, he says concerning the *mind*: *what is true, it judges* (considers, discerns; or, as Alexander of Hales reports, Summa., p. II. q. 69 in princ.: “mind” is said as *one measuring* [a metiendo].).
[4] Cf. Exposition on the Psalms, Ps. 3, n. 3; On the Trinity, Bk. XV, ch. 7, n. 11. See also the book On the Spirit and the soul, chs. 11 and 34. (St.) Isidore agrees, Etymologies, Bk. XI, ch. 1.
[5] Cf. (St.) Isidore, loc. cit., and the book On the Spirit and the soul, ch. 34. — Concerning these four etymologies, which ought to be judged by the custom of that age, see Alexander of Hales, Summa.,

[8] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus bene *dicuntur potentiae*.
[9] Plures codd. ut A F G H K T Y bb *simul* pro *similiter*.
[10] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, repetit hic *ad*. Paulo infra post *Differt* ex pluribus codd. ut H P Q X Z ee posuimus *iterum* loco *etiam*.
[11] Hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp.
[12] Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 indebite omittit *gratia et*. Nam distinguitur gratia sanctificans a virtutibus.
[13] Vide IX. de Trin. c. 2. n. 2. et X. c. 11. n. 17; XIV. ac XV. c. 3. n. 5 seqq. — Sub vocabulo *hanc* intellige *secundam* assignationem.

p. IV, q. 12, m. 1, a. 2, near the end (in other editions, q. 55).
[6] The codices are divided among themselves; very many indeed as G O T and bb have *(St.) Augustine* [Augustinus], which we follow, but others as A C L S Z etc. have instead *behold* [ecce]; however all, contrary to the Vatican edition, have *says* [dicit] in place of *it is said* [dicitur]. Edition 1 has *Master (Peter) and (St.) Augustine (say) behold the mind* [dicit Magister et Augustinus: esse mens].
[7] The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has *there (it)* [ibi] in place of *that* [ille].
[8] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has less well *are . . . meant (as) powers*.
[9] Very many codices as A F G H K T Y bb have *simultaneously* [simul] for *similarly* [similiter].
[10] The Vatican edition, disagreeing with the manuscripts and edition 1, here repeats *to* [ad]. A little below this at *it differs* [Differt] from very many codices as H P Q X Z and ee we have put *Again* [iterum] in place of *Also* [etiam].
[11] Here in a. 1, q. 2 in the body.
[12] The Vatican edition without the authority of any manuscript nor of edition 1 unduly omits *grace and*. For sanctifying grace is distinguished from the virtues.
[13] See On the Trinity, Bk. IX, ch. 2, n. 2 and Bk. X, ch. 11, n. 17; Bks. XIV and XV, ch. 3, n. 5 ff.. — Understand by the word *this* [hanc] the *second* assignation.

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dispositio- / -nem ut per virtutem; ad diligendum vero bonum suum[1] per innatam dispositionem; et ad diligendum se ipsum per sui naturalem originem. Cum enim sit sibi indistanter unitus, semper est habilis ad se amandum. *Similiter*, cum *intellectus* noster semper sit sibi praesens, semper est habilis sibi ad se cognoscendum. Et sic patet illud quod obiicitur de coaevitate; nam quoad tales habitus est bene coaevitas.

disposition / as through a virtue; but to love [diligendum] its own[1] good through an innate disposition; and to love its own self through its own natural origin. For since it is united to itself without separation [indistanter], it is always handy [habilis] to love itself. *Similarly*, since our *intellect* is always present to itself, it is always handy for itself to cognize itself. And thus is clear that which is objected concerning coevity [coevitate]; for in regard to such habits there is rightly a coevity.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tres debent[2] esse habitus secundum tres potentias; dicendum, quod in hac trinitate non cadit nec habet locum habitus memoriae, quia attenditur[3] in ipsa anima secundum quod convertitur supra se: et ideo ipsa animae substantia tenet locum memoriae, et ipsa praesentia et oblatio, qua anima offert se semper suae intelligentiae, tenet locum habitus et actus memoriae. Et ita patet, quod ibi cadunt tantum habitus duarum potentiarum; et ideo est ibi trinitas.

2. To that which is objected, that the habits ought[2] to be three according to the three powers; it must be said, that in this trinity the habit of memory neither falls nor has a place, because (a trinity)[3] is attained in the soul itself according to which it is converted upon itself: and for that reason the substance itself of the soul holds a place for the memory, and the presence itself and the oblation, by which the soul always offers itself to its own intelligence, hold a place for the habit and act of memory. And thus it is

clear, that there only the habits of the two powers fall; and for that reason there is a trinity there.

3. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de verbo Magistri; dicendum, quod intelligitur non pro animae substantia tota;[4] quod si aliter intelligatur, non habet veritatem verbum Magisteri. Quod patet per Augustinum, qui occasione huius imaginis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam habere cognitionem sui innatam, quae est cognitio[5] suae substantiae. Et *praeterea*, nihil unum in anima cognoscit et diligit nisi substantia: ergo si mens staret pro una potentia, non haberet illos duos actus, scilicet nosse et amare.

3. To that which is last objected concerning the word of Master (Peter); it must be said, that it is understood not for the whole substance of the soul;[4] because if it is otherwise understood, the word of Master (Peter) has not truth. Because it is clear through (St.) Augustine, who on the occasion of this image shows throughout almost the whole tenth (book of) On the Trinity, that the soul has an innate cognition of itself, which is the cognition[5] of its substance. And *moreover*, no one thing [nihil unum] in the soul cognizes and loves [diligit] except the substance: therefore if "mind" would stand for one power, it would not have those two acts, that is "to know" and "to love" [nosse et amare].

SCHOLION.

I. De hac quaestione audiendus est ipse S. Doctor, qui in anecdoto primo Prologo ad II. Sententiarum (cuius initium iam dedimus in Prolegomenis c. 1. § 2.) dicit: « Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me declinasse a positionibus Magisteri Sententiarium maxime in duobus: in hoc scilicet, quod cum Magister parte secunda distinctionis tertiae in secunda assignatione trinitatis, quam dicit consistere in *mente*, *notitia* et *amore*, dicat, *mentem* accipi non pro anima, sed pro superiori portione, a me dictum reperitur, mentem ibi pro substantia animae stare. Rursus, cum Magister dicat d. 7., quod potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, utpote nomen significans essentiam, magis illi opinioni adhaesi, quae dicit, potentiam generandi dictam esse proper relationem. Sed si quis recte inspiciat, in neutro praedictorum inveniet me nec a positione Magistri nec a veritatis tramite declinasse. Nam quando dixi in illa trinitatis assignatione mentem accipi pro animae substantia ratione superioris partis, hoc ideo dictum est, quia si mens staret ibi pro superiori portione, cum illa sit animae potentia, et non sit unius potentiae *nosse* et *amare*, sicut videbitur infra (cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.), iam non esset ibi trinitas, sed quaternitas. *Iterum*, potentiae proprie non est agere, sed substantiae per

SCHOLIUM

I. On this question must be heard the Seraphic Doctor, who in the unpublished Prologue to the Second Book of Sentences (the beginning of which we have already published in the Prolegomenon, ch. 1, § 2) says first: « But perhaps it seems to someone, that I have departed from the positions of the Master of Sentences mostly on two (points): that is in this, that when Master (Peter) in the second part of the third distinction, on the second impression of a trinity, which he says consists in *mind*, *knowledge* and *love*, says, that *mind* is to be accepted not for the "soul", but for the superior portion (of it), one discovers what was said by myself, that "mind" there stands for the substance of the soul. Again, when Master (Peter) says in d. 7, that the power of generating is common to the three Persons, as [utpote] a name signifying the essence, I adhered more to that opinion, which says, that the power of generating is said on account of relation. But if anyone rightly inspects (the matter), in neither of the aforesaid shall he find me (standing) or that I have departed from the position of Master (Peter) or from the foot-path of truth. For when I said, that in that assignation of a trinity "mind" is accepted for the substance of the soul by reason of (its) superior part, for that reason this was said, because, if

potentiam; et ideo, si proprie et vere loquitur Augustinus, cum dicit, *mens novit* etc., *mens* ibi supponit animae substantiam. Et hoc iterum innuit Augustinus, cum postea occasione huius trinitatis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam nosse se ipsam. *Postremo*, cum illi habitus notitiae et amoris sint omnino consubstantiales, non addunt novam essentiam super potentiam, sed se ipsis potentiae sunt habiles, et ita non possunt ipsis potentiis communicari sive cum superiori parte rationis. Et propterea non negat Magister, quod mens non accipiatur pro ipsa anima, sed quod non accipitur pro *tota* anima secundum omnes potentias, sed pro ipsa substantia ratione superioris portionis. In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi ».

"mind" stood there fore the superior portion, since that is a power of the soul, and (since) it does not belong to one power *to know* and *to love*, as is seen below (cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1), there would not be a trinity there, but a quaternity. *Again*, to act does not belong properly to a power, but to a substance through a power; and for that reason, if (St.) Augustine is speaking properly and truly, when he says, *the mind knows* etc., *mind* there supposes the substance of the soul. And this again does (St.) Augustine hint at [innuit], when after the occasion of this trinity he shows throughout almost the whole tenth (book of) On the Trinity, that the soul knows its very self. *Finally*, since those habits of knowledge and love are entirely consubstantial, they do not add a new essence upon (their) power, but are by themselves [se ipsis] handy powers, and thus they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves nor to the superior part of the reason. And moreover Master (Peter) does not deny, that "mind" is not accepted for the soul itself, but that it may not be accepted for the *whole* soul according to all (its) powers, but for the substance itself by reason of (its) superior portion. In this, therefore, I have not contradicted Master (Peter), but rather have explained his word in accord with the rule of truth, as I estimate it ».

II. Verba in 2. fund., quod « nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare », sic intelliguntur: se intelligere et amare non sunt actus alicuius habitus acquisiti, sed potentiae animae concreatae et consubstantialis, licet ad hos actus etiam habitus dispositive concurrere possint. Unde etiam B. Albert. (hic a. 36.) de eodem textu Augustini dicit: « Habitus non est nosse se et amare se, sed potius *habentis* habitum secundum ipsum habitum vel per ipsum habitum est nosse se et amare se ». Item Petr. a Tar. (hic. q. 7. a. 1.) ait: « Ad cognoscendum vero se ipsam mens nullo habitu utitur ». Cfr. etiam Bonav. hic. q. 2 ad 4.

II. The words in the second fundament, that « to no habit does it belong to know or love itself », are thus to be understood: to understand and love oneself are not acts of any acquired habit, but co-created and consubstantial powers of the soul, though for those acts even habits can dispositively concur. Whence even Bl. (now St.) Albertus (here in a. 36) concerning the same text of (St.) Augustine says: « It does not belong to a habit to know itself and love itself, but rather it belongs *to the one having* the habit to know oneself and to love oneself according to the habit itself and/or through the habit itself ». Likewise (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 7, a. 1) says: « But to cognized its very self the mind uses no habit ». Cf. also (St.) Bonaventure, here in a. 2, at n. 4.

III. In solut. ad 1. *triplex habitus* distinguitur, scil. ab *acquisitione*, ab *innata dispositione*,

II. In the solution to n. 1 a *threefold habit* is distinguished, that is as an *acquisition*, as

a *sui ipsius origine*. Differentia secundi et tertii in hoc consistit, quod secundus habitus non est proprie animae concreatus et coaevus, licet dispositio ad hunc habitum sit concreata et coaeva. Sic anima cognoscit et diligit ex innata dispositione proprium bonum (commodum). Tertius vero habitus, quo anima se ipsam cognoscit et diligit, est proprie ibi concreatus, cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — In eadem solut. tangitur quaestio, quo sensu intellectus noster *semper se intelligat*. Doctrina Seraphici de hoc omnino concordat cum S. Thom. (hic q. 4. a. 5; S. I. q. 93. a. 7. ad 4.), Scot. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 8. n. 13.) et Richard. (hic a. 2. q. 2.). Hi negant, animam actualem sui intellectionem habere, praesertim talem qua se discernat ab aliis; concedunt tamen, quod propter praesentiam obiecti « nihil deficit actui primo . . .ad quem debet sequi actus secundus, qui est intellectio. Et forte propter hoc dicit frequenter Augustinus, quod anima novit semper se, propter istam propinquitatem ad actum noscendi, ubi nulla est imperfectio in actu primo. Hoc autem modo anima non semper novit lapidem » etc. (Scot. loc. cit.). Alii tamen doctores, ut Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 3.) et Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 7) docent, animam semper se nosse et amare, non tantum habitualiter, sed etiam actualiter, qui tamen advertat hos intimos actus. Cfr. etiam Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 12.), qui in hac quaestione anceps haeret.

an *innate disposition*, as *its own very origin*. The difference of the second and the third consists in this, that the second "habit" is not properly co-created and coeval to the soul, though a disposition to this habit is co-created and coeval. Thus the soul cognizes and loves [diligit] from an innate disposition (its) proper (suitable) good. But the third habit, whereby the soul cognizes and loves [diligit] its very self, has been co-created in it properly, cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — In the same solution is touched upon the question, by which sense our intellect *always understands itself*. The doctrine of the Seraphic (Doctor) concerning this concords entirely with St. Thomas (here in q. 4, q. 5; Summa., I, q. 93, a. 7, at n. 4), with (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Sent., Bk. II, d. 3. q. 8, n. 13) and with Richard of Middleton (here at q. 2. q. 2). These deny, that the soul has an actual intellection of itself, especially such as whereby it discerns itself from others; however they do concede, that on account of the presence of the object « nothing is lacking to the first act . . . to which there ought to follow the second act, which is intellection. And perhaps on account of this does (St.) Augustine frequently say, that the soul always knows itself, on account of that nearness (of the soul) to the act of knowing, where there is no imperfection in the first act. But in this manner the soul does not always know the stone » etc. (Scotus loc. cit.). However other doctors, as (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 5. a. 3) and Henry of Ghent (Quodlibetals, 4, q. 7) teach, that the soul always knows and loves itself, not only habitually, but even actually, but, however, that it does not advert to those most interior acts. Cf. also (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian (here in q. 12), who on this question clings to a twofold (position).

IV. De ipsa conclusione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., hic q. 9; Report. q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 5; S. I. q. 93. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 36; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. p. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 1 et q. 7 a. unic. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Richard. a. Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Biel, hic. q. 10.

IV. Concerning the conclusion itself: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 6, § 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 9; Reportatio, q. 7. — St. Thomas, here in q. 5; Summa., I, q. 93, q. 6. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 36; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, q. 2, p. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 6, a. 1 and q. 7, a. sole. — Giles the Roman, here in princ. 2 of q. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in

[1] Codd. I O *summum* loco *suum*; sed non bene. Mox cod. T post *sibi* addit *ispi* et paulo infra incongrue cum aliis omittit *intellectus noster*.
[2] Ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *debent* pro *dicuntur*.
[3] Supple: trinitas.
[4] Cod. Z addit *sed parte superiori scilicet*, ed. 1 autem: *sed supple pro conversione animae ad Deum vel reflexione ad sui considerationem ad Deum*.
[5] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *agnitio*; et immediate post *propterea* loco *praeterea*, sed falso, quia revera novum / habetur argumentum ex ratoine, non ex auctoritate petitum. Mox auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 post *anima* expunximus particulam *et*. Cod. O post *nihil* addit *aliud*.

[1] Codices I and O have *the most high* [summum] in place of *its own* [suum]; but not well. Then codex T at *to itself* [sibi] inserts *very* [sibi ipsi] and a little below this it omits incongruously *our intellect* [intellectus noster].
[2] With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *there ought* [debent] in place of *there are said* [dicuntur].
[3] Supply: a trinity.
[4] Codex Z adds *but for (its) superior part, that is* [sed parte superiori scilicet], but edition 1: *but supply for the conversion of the soul toward God and/or the reflection regarding the consideration of itself toward God* [sed supple pro conversione animae ad Deum vel reflexione ad sui considerationem ad Deum].
[5] The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has *acknowledging* [agnitio]; and immediately after this *on account of (this)* [propterea] in place of *besides* [praeterea], but falsely, because in truth a new argument is had, sought from reason, not from authority. Then on the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 after *in the soul* we have expunged *both* [et]. Codex O after *no* [nihil] adds *other* [aliud].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. II.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 91-92.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART II

ARTICLE II

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum mens, notitia et amor habeant ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

QUESTION 2

Whether mind, knowledge and love have order, equality and consubstantiality.

Secundo quaeritur de istis in comparatione ad invicem, secundum triplicem comparationem, quam ponit Augustinus, videlicet *ordinis*, *aequitalitas* et *consubstantialitatis*, et Magister recitat in littera.[1] *Ordo* est inter haec, quia mens est parens, notitia est proles, tertius est amor ab utroque procedens. *Aequalitas* etiam est ibi, quia mens tantum se novit, quantum est, et tantum se[2] diligit, quantum se novit. *Consubstantialitas* etiam; unde Augustinus nono de Trinitate:[3] « Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, substantialiter haec in anima existere, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, aut ulla qualitas aut quantitas; quidquid enim tale est, non excedit substantiam, in qua est. Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare etiam aliud »; et ita vult, quod amor sit consubstantialis menti.

Second there is asked concerning these in comparison to each other, according to the threefold comparison, which (St.) Augustine posits, namely of *order*, *equality* and *consubstantiality*, and (which) Master (Peter) quotes [recitat] in the text.[1] *Order* is among them, because the mind is a parent, knowledge is (its) offspring, the third is the love [amor] proceeding from both. *Equality* is also there, because as much as it is, so much does the mind know itself, and as much as it knows itself, so much does it love [diligit] itself.[2] *Consubstantiality* also; whence (St.) Augustine in the ninth (book) On the Trinity:[3] « We are admonished, if we can in whatever manner see, that this exists substantially in the soul, not as in a subject, as color in a body, or (as) any quality or quantity; for whatever is such, does not exceed the substance, in which it is. But the mind by the love [amore], by which it loves itself, can love also another »; and thus he would (have it), that love be consubstantial to the mind.

1. Sed obiicitur contra hoc: Primo videtur, quod in his non sit *ordo* nec[4] origo. Aut enim accipiuntur pro habitibus *innatis*, aut *acquisitis*. Si pro *innatis*, nullus est ordo, quia simul sunt cum ipsa anima; si pro *acquisitis*, sic amor praecedit notitiam; nullus enim acquirit[5] vel studet aliquid addiscere, nisi amet scire. Unde Augustinus in fine noni de Trinitate:[6] « Partum mentis antecedit appetitus, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniendo, nascitur proles, quae est ipsa notitia ». Aut ergo non est ordo, aut non est talis ordo.

1. But there is objected against this: First it seems, that among these there is not an *order* nor[4] an origin. For either they are accepted as *innate* habits, or as *acquired* (ones). If as *innate* (habits), there is no order, because they are simultaneously with the soul itself; if as *acquired* (habits), thus love precedes knowledge; for no one acquires[5] and/or strives to learn anything, unless he love to know. Whence (St.) Augustine at the end of the ninth (book) On the Trinity says:[6] « Part of the mind goes before [antecedit] the appetite, from which that which we want to know by seeking and finding, there is born an offspring, which is knowledge itself ». Therefore either there is not an order, or there is not such an order.

2. Item, videtur quod non sit ibi *aequalitas*. Aut enim notitia et amor accipiuntur per comparationem ad *res inferiores*, aut ad *animam*. Si ad *res inferiores*, manifestum

2. Likewise, it seems that there is not an *equality* there. For either knowledge and love are accepted through a comparison to *inferior things*, or to *the soul*. If to *inferior*

est, quod non est ibi aequalitas; multa enim novimus, quae non amamus; si comparatione[7] ad *animam*, aut est aequalitas quantum ad *intensionem*, aut quantum ad *extensionem*. Quantum ad *extensionem*, non; illud constat, quia unum tantum[8] est ibi: ergo quantum ad *intensionem*; sed quod hoc sit falsum, videtur, quia cum sciamus animam minorem Deo et maiorem corpore, contingit quandoque, quod eam amamus magis quam Deum, et minus quam corpus; et ita quantitas[9] amoris non sequitur quantitatem notitiae.

things, it is manifest, that there is not an inequality there; for we know many (things), which we do not love; if in comparison[7] to *the soul*, either there is equality as much as regards *intensity* [intensionem], or as much as regards *extension*. As much as regards *extension*, not (so); it is established, that there is only[8] one (thing) there: therefore as much as regards *intensity*; but it seems that this is false, because though we know [sciamus] that the soul (is) less than God and greater than the body, it happens sometimes, that we love it more than God, and less than the body; and thus the quantity[9] of love does not follow the quantity of knowledge.

3. Item, quod non sit ibi *consubstantialitas*, videtur, quia amor et notitia sunt habitus et sunt[10] qualitates; ergo videtur, quod essentialiter differant ab ipsa mente.

3. Likewise, it seems that there is not a *consubstantiality* there, because love and knowledge are habits and they are[10] qualities; therefore it seems, that essentially they differ from the mind itself.

4. Item, ratio Augustini[11] est, quod non sint in anima sicut accidentia, quia se extendunt extra; sed hoc nihil est, quia accidentia se extendunt extra, ut calor calefaciendo et color immutando visum. *Praeterea*, homo cognoscit aliqua cognoscibilia scientia acquisita, quae est accidens, et ita se extendit extra.

4. Likewise, (St.) Augustine's[11] reason is, that they are not in the soul as accidents, because they extend themselves outside; but this is nothing, because accidents do extend themselves outside, as heat by a thing-that-heats [calefaciendo] and color by a that-which-alters a (thing) seen [immutando visum]. *Moreover*, man cognizes some cognizables by acquired knowledge [scientia acquisita], which is an accident, and thus extends itself outside.

CONCLUSIO.

Mens, notitia, amor habent ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

CONCLUSION

Mind, knowledge, (and) love have an order, an equality and a consubstantiality.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus[12] assignat, in his est *ordo*, *aequalitas* et *consubstantialitas*.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that as (St.) Augustine[12] assigns (them), there is among these an *order*, an *equality* and a *consubstantiality*

Ordo autem attenditur in his habitibus animae connaturalibus in comparatione ad *actus*, sicut ponitur ordo in fide,[13] spe et caritate, licet simul infundantur.

But the *order* is attained among these connatural habits of the soul in comparison to *acts*, just as there is posited an order among faith,[13] hope and charity, though they are infused simultaneously.

1. Et sic patet quod obiicitur in contrarium, quia non est ordo in ipsis habitibus absolute consideratis, sed per relationem ad actus.

1. And thus is clear what is objected in the Contrary, that there is not an order among the habits themselves considered absolutely, but through a relation to (their) acts.

Similiter est ibi *aequalitas* secundum conversionem animae supra se et praedictorum habitum perfectionem. Unde

Similarly there is an *equality* there according to the soul's conversion upon itself and the perfection of the aforesaid

dicit Augustinus in nono de Trinita- / -te, ...

habits. Whence (St.) Augustine says in the ninth (book) On the Trinity, . . .

[1] Cap. 3. circa finem. — Mox Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 post *ordo* addit *autem* et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 ponit *quod* loco *quia* ac *ultimus* pro *tertius*.
[2] Fide codd. I aa adiecimus *se* certe supplendum.
[3] Cap. 4. n. 5: Simul etiam admonemur, si utcuque videre possumus, haec in anima existere et tanquam involuta evolvi, ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas. Quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum, in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis. Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se. — In quo textu plurimi codd. falso habet *utrumque* loco *utcumque* et minus bene *animo* pro *anima*; Vat. autem ponit *consistere* loco *existere*.
[4] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 incongrue *vel* pro *nec*.
[5] Ita omnes codd. et edd. Magis placeret *inquirit*, si haec lectio aliquo cod. culciretur.
[6] Cap. 12. n. 18, in quo textu post *appetitus* originale addit *quidam* et in fine omittit verba *quae est*; Vat. autem post *quo* addit *ad* et ponit *noscere* loco *nosse*.
[7] Vat. *per comparationem*, sed contra mss. Mox codd. V X post *animam* addunt *tunc*, ed 1 *et tunc*.
[8] Multi codd. ut A F T V X Y etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt *tantum*.
[9] Plures codd. ut A C L R S U aa bb cum ed. 1 minus apte *qualitas*; agitur siquidem de gradu intensionis.
[10] Ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *sunt*.
[11] Libr. IX. de Trin. c. 4. n. 5; vide supra fundam. 1. huius q. — Paulo post Vat. praeter fidem mss. *accidentia enim* pro *quia accidentia* et in fine argumenti *extendunt* loco *extendit*.
[12] Libr. IX. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18; vide in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem.
[13] Ope mss. et ed. 1 sustulimus hic additum *et*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A C G K L S T bb cum ed. 1 *crebro in* loco *ordo in*.

[1] Chapter 3, near the end. — Then the Vatican edition contrary to very many codices and edition 1, at *Order* add *But* [autem] and contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 it puts *because* [quod] in place of *because* [quia] and *the last* [ultimus] in place of *the third* [tertius].
[2] Trusting in codices I and aa we have inserted *itself* [se] which must certainly be supplied.
[3] Chapter 4, n. 5: We are also at the same time admonished, if we can in any manner see, that these exist in the soul and as things involuted they are ex-voluted, to be judged [sentiantur] and counted substantially, and/or, as I say, essentially, not as in a subject, as color or figure in a body or any other quality or quantity. For whatever is such, does not exceed the subject, in which it is. For that color or figure of this body cannot be also of another body. But the mind by the love, by which it loves itself, can love also another besides itself. — In which text very many codices falsely have *each* [utrumque] in place of *in any manner* [utcumque] and the less well *spirit* [animo] in place of *soul* [anima]; but the Vatican edition puts *consist* [consistere] in place of *exist* [existere].
[4] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has incongruously *and/or* [vel] in place of *nor* [nec].
[5] Thus all the codices and editions. Here *inquires into* [inquirit] would be more pleasing, if this reading were supported by any codex.
[6] Chapter 12, n. 18, in which text at *appetite* [appetitus] the original adds *a certain* [quidam] and at the end omits the words *which is*; but the Vatican edition after *from which* [quo] adds *for* [ad] and it puts *to know* [noscere] in place of *to know* [nosse].
[7] The Vatican edition has *through a comparison* [per comparationem], but contrary to the manuscripts. Then codices V and X after *soul* add *then* [tunc], edition 1 adds *and then* [et tunc].
[8] Many codices as A F T V X Y etc. together with edition 1 omit *only* [tantum].
[9] Very many codices as A C L R S U aa bb together with edition 1 have less aptly *the quality* [qualitas]; since it deals with a grade of intensity.
[10] From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted *they are* [sunt].
[11] On the Trinity, Bk. IX, ch. 4. n. 5; see above in the 1st fundament of this question. — A little after this the Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts has *for accidents* [accidentia enim] in place of *because accidents* [quia accidentia] and at the end of the argument *do they extend themselves* [se extendunt] in place of *extends* [se extendit].
[12] On the Trinity, Bk. IX, ch. 12, n. 18; see the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3 near the end.
[13] With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have removed here the added *and* [et]. A little before this very many codices as A C G K L S T and bb together with edition 1 have *often among* [crebro in] in place of *an order among*.

Trinita- / -te,[1], quod non est in his habitibus aequalitas, nisi secundum quod perfecti sunt.

the Trinity,[1] that there is not among these habits an equality, except according to which they have been perfected.

2. Et sic patet solutio ad illud quod de amore obiicitur,[2] quia ille amor non est perfectus amor, sed libidinosus et inordinatus. — Vel dicendum, quod aequales sunt, secundum quod sunt *connaturales*; quantum enim est quis habilis vel facilis ad cognoscendum se, tantum ad se amandum; de habitibus vero *acquisitis*, malis vel bonis, non est verum; et de his non intelligitur.

2. And thus is clear the solution to that which is objected concerning love,[2] because that love is not a perfect love, but a libidinous and inordinate (one). — And/or it must be said, that they are equal, according to which they are *connatural*; for as much as any are handy [habilis] and/or facile to cognize themselves, so much (are they) to love themselves; but concerning *acquired* habits, evil and/or good, it is not true; and of these it is not understood (in this manner).

Similiter est ibi tertium, scilicet *consubstantialitas*, quia secundum quod dictum est supra,[3] amor et notitia animae connaturales sunt, secundum quod supra se convertitur; et sic nihil omnino addunt super ipsas potentias. Per hoc enim, quod anima sibi praesens est, habet notitiam; per hoc, quod est unum sibi, habet habitum amoris; et ideo, sicut potentiae sunt consubstantiales animae, ut supra[4] visum est, ita et huiusmodi habitus. Unde etsi videantur dicere modum habitus vel qualitatis, realiter tamen nihil supra potentias addunt.

Similarly there is a third there, that is a *consubstantiality*, because according to what has been said above,[3] love and knowledge [notitia] are connatural to the soul, according to which it is converted upon itself; and thus they add nothing entirely upon the powers themselves. For through this, that the soul it present to itself, it has knowledge; through this, that it is a one to itself [unum sibi], it has the habit of love; and for that reason, just as the powers are consubstantial to the soul, as has been seen above,[4] so also habits of this kind. Whence even if they seem to mean a manner of habit and/or of quality, however they really add nothing upon the powers.

3. Et sic patet responsio ad obiectum, quod[5] non sunt qualitates isto modo.

3. And thus is clear the response to the objection [objectum], that[5] they are not qualities in that manner.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ratione Augustini, dicendum, quod illa ratio non concludit principaliter, quod amor vel notitia sint substantialiter in anima; et hoc est,[6] quia tunc pari ratione posset dici et obiici de omni amore; sed concludit ex consequenti, quod patet sic. Cum enim amor *extenditur* extra suum subiectum alium amando, hoc est per virtutem substantiae, sicut per se non *est*, nisi[7] per substantiam. Si ergo amor et notitia extenduntur per virtutem substantialem, et hae sunt intelligentia et voluntas; et amor, quo anima amat se, est

4. To that which is objected concerning (St.) Augustine's reason, it must be said, that that reason does not conclude from a principle [principaliter], that love and/or knowledge are in the soul substantially; and this is,[6] because then for an equal reason it could be said and objected concerning every love; but it concludes from the consequence [ex consequenti], that it is thus clear. For when love *is extended* outside its own subject by loving another, this is through the virtue of the substance, just as it *is* not through itself, except[7]

idem cum ipsa voluntate; et similiter[8] notitia, qua cognoscit, non est aliud quam intelligentia: restat ergo, quod amor et notitia respectu sui sunt ipsi menti consubstantiales.

through the substance. If therefore love and knowledge are extended through substantial virtue, and these are the intelligence and the will; and love, by which the soul loves itself, is the same with the will itself; and similarly[8] knowledge, by which it cognizes (itself), is not other than the intelligence: it therefore remains, that love and knowledge in respect to themselves are consubstantial to the mind itself.

SCHOLION.

I. Pro faciliore intelligentia triplicis conclusionis notandum, quod ratio *ordinis*, quem habent *mens* et *amor*, non intelligitur, quatenus ista tria absolute et in se considerantur, sed in respectu ad suos actus. Similiter *aequalitas* non attenditur quoad aequalitatem in entitate, sed quoad actus super animam reflexos, dum anima intelligit se totam et se diligit, quantum se cognoscit. Quoad solutionem argumenti contra aequalitatem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. Denique *consubstantialitas* non intelligitur absoluta cum exclusione cuiusvis distinctionis, sed in sensu in praecedenti quaestione explicato. — Insuper notandum, quod consubstantialitas, quam notitia et amor habent cum mente, non accipitur proprie, quatenus sunt actus (quia actus secundi et accidentia non possunt esse realiter idem cum substantia animae), sed quatenus sunt habitus concreati. In hoc sensu dicit Scot. (hic q. 9.): « Ista tria ex parte animae, ut sunt sub tribus actibus suis, in istis, inquam, tribus est consubstantialitas ».

SCHOLIUM

I. For a easier understanding of the threefold conclusion it must be noted, that the reason for the *order*, which *mind* and *love* have, is not to be understood, to the extent that those three are to be considered absolutely and in themselves, but in respect to their own acts. Similarly *equality* it not attained in regard to an equality in entity, but in regard to the acts reflected upon [super] the soul, while the soul understands its whole self and loves [diligit] itself, as much as it cognizes itself. In regard to the solution to the argument against equality cf. Alexander of Hales, <u>Summa</u>., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7. Next *consubstantiality* is not to be understood as absolute with the exclusion of any distinction, but in the sense explained in the preceding question. — Besides it must be noted, that the consubstantiality, which knowledge and love have with the mind, is not to be accepted properly, to the extent that they are acts (because second acts and accidents cannot be really the same with the substance of the soul), but to the extent they are co-created habits. In this sense (Bl. John Duns) Scotus says (here in q. 9): « Those three on the part of the soul, as they are under their own three acts, in those three, I say, there is a consubstantiality ».

II. In solutione *ad 4.* supponitur, quod nullum accidens se possit extendere ad extra virtute propria, sed tantum virtute alicuius substantialis, uti iam diximus in Scholio ad q. 3 articuli praecedentis. Hoc substantiale est ipsa duplex potentia intellectus et voluntatis; et hoc est verum de actu quocumque, sive tendat ad extra, sive super se reflectatur. Si autem *actus* harum potentiarum ad ipsam mentem ut cognitam et amatam referuntur, non sunt in

II. In the solution *to n. 4* it is supposed, that no accident can extend itself <u>ad extra</u> on its own virtue, but only by virtue of something substantial, as we have already said in the Scholium to q. 3 of the preceding article. This substantial is itself the twofold power of the intellect and of the will; and this is true of any act, either as it tends <u>ad extra</u>, or as it is reflected upon itself. But if the *acts* of these powers are referred to the mind itself as a thing cognized and loved, they are not

anima sicut accidens in subiecto, sed substantialiter. — Eodem modo etiam S. Thomas hac sententiam S. Augustini explicat, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. et ad 5.

III. Hanc quaestionem explicite tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. — Scot., hic q. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 37. et seq.; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. ad 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 11.

in the soul, as an accident (is) in a subject, but substantially. — In the same manner also does St. Thomas explain this sentence of St. Augustine, Summa., I, q. 77, a. 1, at n. 1 and at n. 5.

III. This question is explicitly treated by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 5, a. 7. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 9. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 37 and ff.; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, at n. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 6, a. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in the 3rd principle of q. 2, a. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 11.

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[1] Cap. 4. n. 4: Recte igitur diximus, haec tria, cum perfecta sunt, esse consequenter aequalia.
[2] Cod. Z addit *quod non valet*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G I T cc post *solutio* ponunt punctum, deinde cod. cc post *obiicitur* adiungit *dicendum*; nihil tamen inmmutandum duximus.
[3] Hic a. 2. a. 1 ad. 1.
[4] Art. 1. q. 3.
[5] Supple: mens, notitia et amor. — Mox. codd. inter se non conveniunt, alii ut A G H K T etc. cum Vat. legunt *qualitas*, alii vero ut B D E F H I X Z cum ed. 1 *qualitates*, quos sequimur.
[6] Mendum Vat. *ex hoc* pro *et hoc est*, et paulo post *conclusit* pro *concludit* castigatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
[7] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *sed* loco *nisi*. Paulo ante codd. P Q *ultra* pro *extra*; deinde nonnulli codd. ut D E F H K Y *aliud*, cod. T *alterum*, codd. L O *aliquid* loco *alium*. Codd. Q (T in margine) post *substantiae* addunt *quia per se non agit*; lectio non spernenda.
[8] Ita codd. Q T cum ed. 1; multi codd. ut A B E F G H K P X Y Z aa etc. *et sic*, Vat. *sic*, quae et paulo infra post *intelligentia* ponit punctum, quo posito argumentum, quod explicatur in Scholio, pertubatur. In fine Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *substantiales*.

[1] Chapter 4, n. 4: Therefore we have rightly said, that these three, when they have been perfected, are consequently equals.
[2] Codex Z adds *that it is not valid* [quod non valet]. A little before this very many codices as A G I T and cc after *solution* [solutio] put a period, then codex cc after *to that which is objected concerning love* [obiicitur] adds *it must be said* [dicendum]; we have judged that nothing it to be altered.
[3] Here in a. 2, q. 1, at n. 1.
[4] Article 1, q. 3.
[5] Supply: mind, knowledge and love. — Then the codices do not agree among themselves, some as A G H K T etc. together with the Vatican edition read *a quality* [qualitas], but others as B D E G H I X Z together with edition 1 read *qualities* [qualitates], which we follow.
[6] The error of the Vatican edition of putting *from this* [ex hoc] in place of *and this it* [et hoc est], and a little after this *concluded* [conclusit] in place of *concludes* [concludit] is corrected from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6.
[7] The Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *but* [sed] in place of *except* [nisi]. A little before this codices P and Q have *beyond* [ultra] in place of *outside* [extra]; then not a few codices as D E F H K Y have *another (thing)* [aliud], codex T *the other* [alterum], codices L and O *anything* [aliquid] in place of *another (subject)* [alium]. Codices Q (T in the margin) after *of the substance* [substantiae] add *because by itself it does not act* [quia per se non agit]; a reading not to be spurned.
[8] Thus codices Q and T together with edition 1; many codices as A B E F G H K P X Y Z aa etc. have *and so* [et sic], the Vatican edition *so* [sic], which also a little below this after *the intelligence* [intelligentia] puts a period, by which the argument, which is explained in the Scholium, is disturbed. At the end the Vatican edition contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, has *substantial* [substantiales].

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likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. II.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 92-93.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART II

ARTICLE II

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 92-93.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum trinitas imaginis, quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore, necessario ducat in cognitionem trium divinarum personarum.

QUESTION 3

Whether the trinity of the image, which consists in mind, knowledge and love, necessarily leads unto the cognition of the Three Divine Persons.

TERTIO ET ULTIMO quaeritur, utrum haec trinitas imaginis, scilicet mentis, notitiae et amoris, ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas. Et videtur quod sic:

THIRD AND LAST there is asked, whether this trinity of image, that is of mind, of knowledge and of love, leads necessarily unto cognition of the Trinity as much as regards the Persons. And it seems that (this is) so:

1. Quia in hac trinitate imaginis est relatio; sed in Deo non est relatio nisi quoad personas: ergo etc.

1. Because in this trinity of the image there is a relation; but in God there is not a relation except in regard to the Persons: ergo etc..

2. Item, in hac trinitate est distinctio, quia notitia non est amor; sed in Deo non est distinctio nisi personarum: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, in this trinity there is a distinction, because knowledge is not love; but in God there is not a distinction except of the Persons: ergo etc.

3. Item, in hac trinitate est origo nascentis unius[1] ab uno et tertii ab utroque: ergo cum ista sint propria personarum, patet etc.

3. Likewise, in this trinity there is an origin of one being born[1] from one and a third from both: therefore since that is proper to the Persons, it is clear etc.

4. Item, in hac trinitate est[2] amor tertio, qui est proprium Spiritus sancti et qui est ad alterum: ergo videtur, quod necessario ducat in Trinitatem personarum.

4. Likewise, in this trinity love is[2] third, which (love) is proper to the Holy Spirit and which (love) is for the other: therefore it seems, that it does necessarily lead unto the Trinity of Persons.

Contra: 1. Haec trinitas intelligitur in creatura sine distinctione personali: ergo potest intelligi et in Deo; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

On the contrary: 1. This trinity is understood in the creature without personal distinction: therefore it can be understood even in God; but this is false: ergo etc..

2. Item, notitia et amor sunt in qualibet personarum; sed per ea quae sunt in omnibus, non venitur in cognitionem distinctionis personalis: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, knowledge and love are in any of the Persons; but through those which are in all, one does not come [non venitur] to the cognition of personal distinction: ergo etc..

3. Item, intellecto quod una tantum esset persona, adhuc nosceret et amaret se: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, having understood that there would only be one Person, it would still know and love itself: ergo etc..

4. Item, philosophi istam trinitatem cognoverunt, et tamen non cognoverunt Trinitatem personarum: ergo haec non necessario[3] ducit in illam.

4. Likewise, the philosophers cognized that trinity, and they did not, however, cognize the Trinity of Persons: therefore this does not necessarily[3] lead unto that.

CONCLUSIO.

Ratio sola ab hac trinitate mentis, notitiae et amoris non ascendit ad cognitionem Trinitatis.

CONCLUSION

The reckoning alone from this trinity of mind, of knowledge and of love, does not ascend to the cognition of the Trinity.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod per hanc trinitatem contingit cognoscere Trinitatem in Deo, et hoc est attribuendo ea quae in hac trinitate sunt illi summae Trinitati. Sed hoc potest esse dupliciter. Aut enim ista tria possunt Deo attribui secundum substantiam, ut per *mentem*[4] intelligamus mentem in Deo, et per *notitiam* in anima notitiam in Deo, et sic de tertio; et sic non ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis nisi quantum ad *appropriata*; et sic intellexerunt philosophi.

I respond: It must be said, that through this trinity one happens to cognize the Trinity in God, and this is by attributing those which are in this trinity to that Most High Trinity. But this can be in a twofold manner. For either those three can be attributed to God according to substance, as through the *mind*[4] we understand the mind in God, and through *knowledge* [notitiam] in the soul, the knowledge in God, and thus concerning the third; and so it does not lead unto cognition of the Trinity except as much as regards (things) *appropriated*; and thus did the philosophers understand (it).

Possunt etiam ista[5] trahi ad Deum ratione *proprietatum*, quae sunt ordo et origo, distinctio et relatio; et sic ducunt in cognitionem Trinitatis quoad propria.

Sed ista ponere vel intelligere in Deo potest fides, sed[6] non ratio; et ita perfecta cognitio imaginis non habetur nisi a fide. Unde bene concedendum est, quod imago, perfecte cognita ut imago, ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis, non autem simpliciter. Et per hoc patet utraque pars.

1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amore, dicendum, quod amor potest dicere complacentiam, et sic est commune; vel potest dicere connexionem sive communionem vel donum, et sic habet rationem personae.

Those[5] can also be drawn to God by reason of (their) *properties*, which are order and origin, distinction and relation; and thus do they lead unto the cognition of the Trinity in regard to what is proper [propria] (to each).

But faith can posit and/or understand those in God, but[6] not reason; and thus a perfect cognition of the image is not had except by faith. Whence it must be well conceded, that the image, perfectly cognized as image, leads unto the cognition of the Trinity, but not simply (speaking). And by this each part is clear.

1. 2. To that which is objected concerning love, it must be said, that "love" can mean "complacency", and thus it is common; and/or it can mean "a connection" or "a communion" and/or "a gift", and thus it has the reckoning of a person.

SCHOLION.

I. Hanc quaestionem alii antiquiores Scholastici praeter Aegid. (hic 3. princ. q. 2. a. 4.) ex professo non tractant. Solutio eius pendet ab iisdem principiis, quae supra p. I. q. 4. posita sunt. De proprietatibus divinarum personarum, et quatenus important ordinem et originem, relationem et distinctionem cfr. infra dd. 26. et 33. — S. Doctor primum et ultimum obiectum non solvit explicite, quia solutionis principia continentur clare in corp. questionis; secundum et tertium breviter solvit, loquendo expresse tantum de *amore* essentiali et personali, quod ad *notitiam* facile applicare potest.

SCHOLIUM

I. This question the other more ancient Scholastics besides Giles (here in the 3rd principle of q. 2, a. 4) do not treat ex professo. Its solution depends on the same principles, which have been posited above in p. I, q. 4. Concerning the properties of the Divine Persons, and to what extent they imply [important] order and origin, relation and distinction cf. below in dd. 26 and 33. — The Seraphic Doctor does not explicitly solve the first and last objection, because the principles of the solution are contained clearly in the body of the question; the second and the third he briefly solves, by speaking expressing only of the essential and personal *love*, because (the same argument) can be applied easily to *knowledge*.

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[1] Plurimi codd. omittunt *unius*; Vat. vero omittit *nascentis* pro quo tamen omnes codd. possunt alligari, licet propter abbreviationem in tantum sint dubiae lectionis, in quantum legi potest vel *nascentis* vel *nativitatis* vel cum ed. 1 *nascibilitatis*. Iuxta regulam illam palaeographicam, secundum quam in similibus casibus, nisi sensus obstet, brevius vocabulum sit eligendum, posuimus *nascentis*, retinentes insuper cum codd. H I T et ed. 1 verbum *unius*. Cfr. infra d. 13. q. 3.

[2] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 legit sic: *tertio reperitur amor*. Cod. X explicative post *tertio* addit *loco*. Ed. 1 *tertius* pro *tertio*. Cod. N post *trinitate* habet *est notitia, quae appropriatur Filio, et amor, qui est*.

[3] Ope mss. et ed. 1 restituimus indebite omissum *necessario*.

[4] Cod. I Y hic addunt bene et cum subnexis

[1] Very many codices omit *of one* [unius]; but the Vatican edition omits *being born* [nascentis], for which, however, all the codices can be alleged, though on account of the abbreviation it is as much a doubtful reading, as one can read either *being born* [nascentis] or *nativity* [nativitatis] or with edition 1 *nascibility* [nascibilitatis]. In accord with that rule of paleography, according to which in similar cases, unless the sense withstands it, the shorter word is to be chosen, we have read *being born* [nascentis], retaining moreover with codices H I T and edition 1 the word *of one* [unius]. Cf. below d. 13, q. 3.

[2] The Vatican edition not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 reads thus: *there is discovered a love for a third (one)* [tertio reperitur amor]. Codex X explicitly after *a third* adds *place* [loco]. Edition 1 has *a third love* [tertius . . . amor] instead. Codex N after *trinity* [trinitate] has *there is a*

cohaerenter *in anima*.
[5] Codd. M aa bb non inepte adiiciunt *tria*.
[6] Vat. *et*, sed obstant plurimi codd. cum ed. 1.

knowledge, which is appropriated to the Son, and a love, which is [est notitia, quae appropriatur Filio, et amor, qui est].
[3] With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored the unduly omitted *necessarily* [necessario].
[4] Codex I and Y here add well, and coherently with what is subjoined, *in the soul* [in anima].
[5] Codices M aa and bb do not ineptly insert *three* [tria].
[6] The Vatican edition has *and* [et], but this withstands very many codices together with edition 1.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III

PARS. II.
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM PARTIS II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 93-94.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PART II
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF PART II*

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 93-94.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Imago Dei permanet*. Contra: Psalmus:[7] *Domine in civitate imaginem ipsorum ad nihilum rediges*.

Respondeo: Imago dicitur dupliciter: quantum ad *substantiale* esse; et *haec*[8]

Doubt I

In this part is asked about the text (of Master Peter) concerning this which he says: *The image of God . . . remains throughout* [permanet]. On the contrary: The Psalm (says):[7] *Lord in the city Thou doest reduce their image to nothing*.

I respond: An "image" is said in a twofold manner: as much as regards *substantial*

respicit trinitatem potentiarum et ordinem et aequalitatem, et sic semper permanet; alio modo prout supra esse addit *bene* esse, ut decorem et honorem; et haec potest perdi, *quia homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit*.[9]

being [substantiale esse]; and *this*[8] respects the trinity of powers and (their) order and equality, and thus it always remains throughout; in another manner insofar as upon being [supra esse] one adds *well* being [bene esse], as decor and honor; and this can be lost, *because man, when he would be in honor, has not understood*.[9]

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid* etc.; ergo memoria,[10] intelligentia et voluntas sunt in praedicamento relationis.

Item quaeritur, quare *mens* dicitur magis ad se quam memoria vel intelligentia?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod *dici ad aliquid* est[11] dupliciter: vel *proprie* et *per se*, sicut pater et filius, vel *ratione alicuius annexi*, quia habet respectum annexum et inclinationem; et sic memoria dicitur *ad aliquid*, quia innatum habet respectum ad memoriale, similiter intelligentia ad intel- / -ligibile et voluntas ad volibile;

Doubt II

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *But "memory" is said regarding something* etc.; therefore memory,[10] intelligence and will are in the predicament of relation.

Likewise it is asked, why *mind* is said more regarding itself than memory and/or intelligence?

I respond: It must be said, that *to be said regarding something* is[11] in a twofold manner: *properly* and *per se*, as a father and a son, and/or *by reason of something annexed*, because it has an annexed regard [respectum] and inclination; and thus "memory" is said *regarding something*, because it has an innate regard for the memorable [ad memoriale], and similarly "intelligence" for the intel- / -ligible and "will" for the willable [volibile];

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[7] 72, 20, ubi Vulgata post *civitate* addit *tua* et loco *ipsorum* cum Vat. habet *eorum*.
[8] Vat. hic et paulo infra *hoc*, sed minus bene et contra plures mss. et ed. 1.
[9] Psalm. 48, 21.
[10] Codd. omittunt *memoria*, sed non bene, uti ex subnexis patet.
[11] Corruptam lectionem Vat., in qua loco *dici* ponitur *dicitur* et omittitur *est*, correximus ope mss. et sex primarum edd.

[7] Psalm 72:20, where the Vulgate at *city* [civitate] adds *Thy* [tua] and in place of *their* [ipsorum] has together with the Vatican edition *their* [eorum].
[8] The Vatican edition here and a little below this has the neuter *this* [hoc], but less well and contrary to very many manuscripts and edition 1.
[9] Psalm 48:21.
[10] The codices omit *memory* [memoria], but not well, as is clear from what is subjoined.
[11] The corrupt reading of the Vatican edition, in which in place of *to be said* [dici] there is put *it is said* [dicitur] and the following *is* [est] is omitted, we have corrected with the help of the manuscripts and six of the first editions.
* [Trans. note: supply *of Master Peter*]

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p. 94

intel- / -ligibile et voluntas ad volibile; et haec obiecta ad invicem habent respectum.[1] Et sic patet obiectio.

the intel- / -ligible and the will for the willable [volibile]; and these objects have a regard for one another.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de *mente*, dicendum, quod mens dicitur ab actu

To that which is asked concerning the *mind*, it must be said, that "mind" is said from an

essentiali. Propterea est intelligendum, quod *quo est*[2] dat animae esse *generalissimum*, et sic dicitur *essentia*; vel inquantum dat esse *generale*, et sic dicitur *vita*, quia anima est in genere viventium; aut[3] inquantum dat esse *spirituale*, et sic *mens*. Mens enim non dicitur nisi quod vivit vita intellectiva. — Vel anima *in se* dicitur essentia, ut *actus* corporis vita, ut *perfectibilis* a Deo mens.

essential act. On that account it must be understood, that (the essential act) *whereby it is*[2] gives to the soul a *most general* being [esse generalissimum], and in this manner "*essence*" is meant; and/or inasmuch as it gives a *general* being [esse generale], and in this manner "*life*" is meant, because the soul is in the genus of living (things); or[3] inasmuch as it gives a *spiritual* being [esse spirituale], and in this manner "*the mind*" (is meant). For "mind" is not said unless a thing [quod] lives by an intellective life. — And/or the soul *in itself* is said (to be) an essence, as life (is said to be) an *act* of a body, (and) as the mind (is said to be) *perfectible* by God.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *tres personae non sunt unius Dei*; quia videtur dicere falsum, quia, si sunt unius essentiae; sed essentia est[4] Deus; ergo sunt unius Dei. *Si dicas*, quod non sequitur; ego quaero, quare non conceditur, quod tres personae sunt unius Dei? Si[5] propter hoc, quod obliquus notat diversitatem; ergo cum essentia non sit diversa a persona, non potest dici: tres personae sunt unius essentiae.

Doubt III

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that *the Three Persons are not of the One God*; because it seems to say (something) false [falsum], because, if They are of the one Essence; but the Essence is[4] God; therefore They are of the One God. *If you say*, that this does not follow; I ask, why it is not conceded, that the three Persons are of the One God? If[5] on account of this, that the oblique denotes [notat] diversity; therefore since the Essence is not diverse from the Person, there cannot be said: "the Three Persons are of the One Essence".

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod genitivus[6] aliquando construitur in ratione *possessionis*, ut si dicatur: bos Petri vel Ioannis; aliquando ex vi *declarationis essentiae*, ut mulier egregiae formae; aliquando *intransitive*, ut creatura salis. *Intransitive* contruitur generale cum speciali; et sic potest dici: subtantia vel persona Dei; *ex vi delcarationis essentiae*, nomen[7] importans formam per modum formae; et sic dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae. Quia ergo, quando dicitur: tres personae sunt unius Dei, *Deus* non significat[8] nec per modum *formae* nec per modum *specificantis*, ideo intelligitur per modum *possidentis* vel principiantis: et ideo simpliciter est falsa.

I respond: It must be said, that the genitive (case)[6] sometimes is construed in the reckoning of *possession*, as if there is said: "the bull of Peter and/or of John"; sometimes out of the force of a *declaration of essence*, as "a woman of egregious form"; sometimes *intransitively*, as "a creature of salt". *Intransitively* the general is construed together with the special; and so there can be said: "the Substance and/or Person of God"; *out of the force of declaration of essence*, a name[7] conveying a form through the manner of a form; and so the Three Persons are said (to be) of the One Essence. Therefore because, when there is said: "the Three Persons are of the One God", "*God*" does not *signify*[8] through the manner of a *form* nor through the manner of *one specifying*, for that reason it is understood through a manner of *one possessing* or of *one beginning*

[principiantis]: and for that reason it is simply false.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *ex maxima parte est dissimilis*. Videtur enim falsum, quia imago est similitudo expressa: ergo si maxime est dissimilis, non est imago.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod est expressio[9] *simpliciter*, vel *in genere*. Si ergo loquamur de expressione simpliciter, sic dico, quod anima rationalis non est valde similis Deo; si autem loquamur in genere creaturae, quia tantum accedit,[10] quantum potest natura creata, sic dicitur valde similis et expressa similitudo Dei.

DOUBT IV

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that *for the most part it is dissimilar*. For it seems false, because an image is an express similitude: therefore if it is mostly dissimilar, it is not an image.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that there is expression[9] *simply* (speaking), and/or *in a genus* [in genere]. Therefore if we speak of an expression simply, I thus say, that the rational soul is not very [valde] similar to God; but if we speak in the genus of the creature, because it approaches[10] (Him) as much as a created nature can, thus (the soul) is said (to be) a very much similar and express similitude of God.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter superflueret*; quia secundum viam istam monstrari posset, quod non sit nisi una persona.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod in *personis* non potest esse *superfluitas*, quia in eis est una sufficientia; unde si una esset superflua, et omnes. Sed[11] non potest ibi esse aliqua *insufficientia*, quia nihil plus habent tres quam una. Sed si essent duae *essentiae*, duae essent sufficientiae, si[12] quaelibet per se esset sufficiens; si autem altera cum altera, quaelibet esset insufficiens: et ita patet, quod non est simile de duabus essentiis, sicut de duabus personis.[12]

DOUBT V

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *If there were two, each would be insufficient, and/or one of the two would be superfluous*; because according to that way it could be demonstrated, that there is not but one Person.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that among the *Persons* there cannot be a *superfluity*, because among Them there is one sufficiency; whence if One were superfluous, (so) also All. But[11] there cannot be There any *insufficiency*, because the Three have nothing more than the One (has). But if there were two *essences*, the two would be sufficient, if[12] any were sufficient by themselves; but if one of the two (were insufficient) with the other, any would be insufficient: and thus it is clear, that it is not the same concerning two essences, as concerning two Persons.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *intellexit, Deum habere sapientiam, quae ab ipso genita est, quia intellexit, eum non esse rem fatuam*; ergo videtur secundum hoc, quod Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod ista consequentia non est intelligenda immediate, scilicet; quia non est res fatua,

DOUBT VI

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that (the mind) *understood, that God has a wisdom, which has been begotten from Himself, because it understood, that He is not a foolish thing* [res fatua]; therefore it seems according to this, that the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that that consequence is not to be understood immediately, that is; that He is not a foolish

ergo habet sapientiam genitam. Sed hoc intelligendum est sic: Deus est substantia spiritualis: ergo est nata cognoscere: ergo si non habet sapientiam, est res fatua; sed non est res fatua: ergo habet sapientiam; sed non est sapientia sine verbo, et non est verbum, nisi procedat a mente et ita generetur: ergo a primo,[14] si habet sapientiam, necesse est, sapientiam esse genitam. Et omnes istas consequentias oportet intelligere immediate.[15]

thing, therefore He has a begotten wisdom. But this is to be understood in this manner: God is a spiritual substance: therefore He is bound to cognize: therefore if He does not have a wisdom, He is a foolish thing; but He is not a foolish thing: therefore He has a wisdom; but there is no wisdom without a word, and there is no word, unless it proceeds from a mind and is thus generated: therefore from the first,[14] if He has a wisdom, it is necessary, that the wisdom be begotten. And it is proper that all those consequences of his be understood immediately.[15]

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[1] De hac duplici specie relationum vide infra d. 30. q. 3.
[2] Videtur supplendum: *actus essentialis ut* (quo est). Vel intellige ut Vat., quae post *quo est* addit *potest intelligi in quantum*. Item codd. F H addunt *dicitur tripliciter vel in quantum*. Alii tamen codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 exhibent textum nostrum.
[3] Cod. Y *vel*. Mox ed. 1 satis bene *speciale* loco *spirituale*; codd. V W post *sic* addunt *est*. Cod. Z post *mens* addit *Unde isti tres actus sunt essentiales, a quibus dicuntur essentia, vita, mens, scilicet esse, vivere et intelligere*; et paulo infra loco *quod* ponit *quia* ac pro *intellectiva* habet *intellectuali*.
[4] Vat. *cum sint unius essentiae et essentia sit*; sed contra ed. 1 et codd., qui in eo tantum discordant, quod nonnulli omittunt particulam *si*, cod. A loco *sed* ponit *si* ac cod. I pro *sed* habet *et*. Lectio in textum recepta S. Doctori familiarior esse videtur.
[5] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 addit *dicis quod*.
[6] Mendum Vat. *generatus* loco *genetivus* emendavimus ops mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6. Paulo infra ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus indebite omissum *essentiae*. — De varia significatione genitivi vide infra, d. 34. dub. 5. et Priscian., XVIII. Grammat. c. 2. ed. Krehl. Lipsiae, 1820. tom. 2. pag. 112. Cfr. etiam Scot., de Grammatica speculativa c. 46-53.
[7] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *ut* loco *nomen*. — Post *formam* supple: construitur.
[8] Aliqui codd. ut D T *significatur*; aliqui ut X Y omittunt prima vice *nec*.
[9] Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. hic *excessus* et paulo infra *excessu* pro *expressione*; codd. Y et cc hic *accessus* et paulo infra *accessu*.
[10] Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 *exprimit*.
[11] Cod. R *Similiter* pro *Sed*.
[12] Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat., quae habet *et*, quo posito vis argumentationis aufertur; cod. I falso *sed*.
[13] Plura de hoc dubio vide supra d. 2. q. 4.
[14] Cod. Y addit *ad ultimum*.
[15] Ed. 1 *non immediate*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.

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[1] Concerning this twofold species of relation see below d. 30. q. 3.
[2] It seems there must be supplied: *the essential act as* (that whereby it is) [actus essentialis ut (quo est)]. And/or understand as the Vatican edition (does), which after *that whereby it is* adds *can be understood inasmuch as* [potst intelilgi in quantum]. In the same way codices F and H add *is said in a threefold manner and/or inasmuch as* [dicitur tripliciter vel in quantum]. But other codices together with editions 1, 2 and 3 exhibit our text.
[3] Codex Y has *and/or* [vel]. Then edition 1 has well enough *special* [speciale] in place of *spiritual* [spirituale]; codices V and W after *in this manner* [sic] add *is* [est]. Codex Z after *mind* [mens] adds *Whence those three acts are essential, from which they mean essence, life, mind, that is, to be, to live and to understand* [Unde isti tres actus sunt essentiales, a quibus dicuntur essentia, vita, mens, scilicet esse, vivere et intelligere]; and a little below this in place of *a thing* [quod] it puts *because* [quia] and in place of *intellective* [intellective] it has *intellectual* [intellectuali].
[4] The Vatican edition has *since they are of the One Essence and the Essence is* [cum sint unius essentiae et essential sit]; but contrary to edition 1 and the codices, which disagree only in this, that not a few omit the particle *if* [si], codex A in place of *but* [sed] puts *if* [si] and codex I in place of *but* [sed] has *and* [et]. The reading received in the text of the Seraphic Doctor seems to be the more familiar one.
[5] The Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 adds *you say that* [dicis quod].
[6] The fault of the Vatican edition, of reading *generated* [generatus] in place of *genitive* [genetivus], we have emended with the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6. A little below this from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted the unduly omitted *of essence* [essentiae]. — Concerning the various significations of the genitive see below, d. 34. dub. 5 and Priscian, Grammar, Bk. XVIII, ch. 2, Krehl's edition, Leipzig 1820, tom. 2, p. 112. Cf. also (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, On Speculative Grammar, chs. 46-53.
[7] The Vatican edition not trusting the manuscripts and edition 1 has *as one* [ut] in place of *a name*

[nomen]. After *bearing a form* [formam] supply : *is construed* [cosntruitur].
[8] Some codices as D and T have *is not signified* [non significatur]; other as X and Y omit the first *neither* [nec].
[9] Very many codices together with the six first editions have *excess* [excessus] here and a little below this *excess* [excessu] in place of *expression* [expressione]; codices Y and cc have *approach* [accessus] here and a little below this *approach* [accessu].
[10] The Vatican edition contrary to the codices and edition 1 has *expresses* [exprimit].
[11] Codex R has *Similarly* [Similiter] in place of *But* [Sed].
[12] Thus nearly all the codices together with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, which has *and* [et], the placing of which bears off the force of the argument; codex I falsely has *but* [sed].
[13] See the very many things concerning this doubt in d. 2, q. 4.
[14] Codex Y adds *lastly* [ad ultimum].
[15] Edition 1 has *non immediately*. Cf. concerning this doubt, d. 32, a. 2, q. 1.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.